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首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors' and officers' liability insurance
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Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors' and officers' liability insurance

机译：管理激励和研发投资：董事和高级职员责任保险的调节作用

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摘要

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm's research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms' long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译：有关管理人员激励对公司研发投入的影响的文献表明，由于研发活动的风险，公司需要提供管理激励措施，以鼓励管理人员对公司的长期研发投入具有酌处权。尽管管理激励会影响公司的R＆D支出，但也有人认为公司R＆D支出具有管理激励计划的功能。本文采用联立方程，通过在台湾证券交易所和台北证券交易所上市的样本公司，研究了R＆D投资的管理自由度与CEO报酬激励机制之间的关系。结果表明，台湾上市公司同时确定了公司的研发投资和首席执行官的薪酬。他们按照在研发投资方面的努力来奖励首席执行官，而首席执行官薪酬则激励首席执行官将其利益与公司在研发方面的长期投资保持一致。对董事和高级管理人员（D＆O）责任保险的保护效果的进一步分析表明，D＆O保护加强了R＆D投资与CEO报酬之间的关系。它鼓励首席执行官为研发活动分配资源，并使首席执行官激励合同对企业的长期投资有效。结果是台湾电子行业的强劲表现。 （C）2016 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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