• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Oxford Economic Papers >When bigger isn't better: bailouts and bank reform
【24h】

When bigger isn't better: bailouts and bank reform

机译：当更大并不更好时：纾困和银行改革

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Taking retail deposits and lending to SMEs and households were the traditional role of commercial banks: but banking in Britain has been transformed by increasing consolidation and by the lure of high returns available from investment banking. With appropriate changes to the Diamond and Dybvig model of commercial banking, we show how market concentration enables banks to collect 'seigniorage' profits; and how 'tail risk' investments which escape regulatory notice allow losses to be shifted onto the taxpayer. In principle, the franchise values associated with market power might assist regulatory capital requirements to check risk-taking. But when big banks act strategically, bailout expectations can undermine these disciplining devices: and the taxpayer ends up 'on the hook' - as in the recent crisis. Structural change is needed to prevent a repeat; and we discuss how the Vickers report proposes to protect the taxpayer by a 'ring fence' separating commercial and investment banking.
机译：商业银行的传统角色是接受零售存款并向中小企业和家庭提供贷款：但是，英国的银行业已经通过增加合并和投资银行业带来的高回报诱惑而发生了转变。通过对商业银行的Diamond和Dybvig模型进行适当的更改，我们展示了市场集中度如何使银行收集“铸币税”利润；以及逃避监管通知的“尾巴风险”投资如何将损失转移到纳税人身上。原则上，与市场支配力相关的特许权价值可以帮助监管资本要求检查风险承担。但是，当大型银行采取战略行动时，纾困的期望可能会破坏这些管教手段：而纳税人最终会“如虎添翼”，就像最近的危机一样。需要进行结构上的改变以防止重演；我们还将讨论维克斯（Vickers）报告如何建议通过将商业银行和投资银行分开的“围栏”来保护纳税人。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Oxford Economic Papers》 |2013年第s1期|i7-i41|共35页
  • 作者

    Marcus Miller; Lei Zhang; Hanhao Li;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK;

    Department of Economics, University of Warwick and School of Economics, Sichuan University;

    University of Warwick;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号