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Privatization, investment, and ownership efficiency

机译:私有化,投资和所有权效率

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摘要

We provide a model that explains the following empirical observations: (ⅰ) private ownership is more efficient than public ownership, (ⅱ) privatizations are associated with increases in efficiency, and (ⅲ) the increase in efficiency predates the privatization. The two key mechanisms explaining the results are: (ⅰ) a government owner keeping control can affect long-run employment levels when investing and (ⅱ) a privatizing government has a stronger incentive to invest than an acquiring firm: the government exploits the fact that investments increase the sales price not only due to the increase in the acquirer's profit, but also due to a reduced profit for the non-acquirer.
机译:我们提供了一个模型,解释了以下经验性观察:(ⅰ)私有制比公有制更有效率;()私有化与效率提高相关;(efficiency)效率提高早于私有化。解释结果的两个关键机制是:(ⅰ)在投资时保持控制权的政府所有者会影响长期就业水平;(ⅱ)私有化的政府比并购公司具有更大的投资动机:政府利用了以下事实:投资增加销售价格不仅是由于收购方利润的增加,而且还因为非收购方利润的减少。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Oxford Economic Papers》 |2012年第4期|p.765-786|共22页
  • 作者单位

    Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm;

    Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE 10215 Stockholm, Sweden, and CEPR;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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