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Incomplete contracts, joint ventures, and ownership restrictions

机译：不完整的合同，合资企业和所有权限制

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摘要

This article allows for both sole-ownership enterprises and joint ventures as forms of integrated production organizations in an economic environment with contract incompleteness and relationship-specificity. When joint ventures are possible, the variable profit of integrated production organizations is always higher than that of outsourcing organizations. We then explore welfare effects of ownership restrictions imposed by a developing country (the South) with the assumption of no cash constraints. We show a decline in Southern welfare and world welfare. We then assume there are cash constraints on Southern agents and show that the equity share chosen by foreign agents is higher than the efficient level, in which case some degree of ownership restriction may improve the world welfare. However, if there is no international discipline on ownership restrictions, the ownership restriction level chosen by the Southern government tends to be overacted and will deteriorate the world welfare.
机译：本文允许在经济环境中具有合同不完整和关系特定性的情况下，独资企业和合资企业都可以作为集成生产组织的形式。当可能成立合资企业时，集成生产组织的可变利润始终高于外包组织的可变利润。然后，我们在没有现金限制的情况下探讨了发展中国家（南方）实施所有权限制的福利效应。我们显示南方福利和世界福利都在下降。然后，我们假定南方代理商存在现金约束，并表明外国代理商选择的股权份额高于有效水平，在这种情况下，一定程度的所有权限制可能会改善世界福利。但是，如果没有关于所有权限制的国际纪律，则南方政府选择的所有权限制级别往往会过高，并会恶化世界福利。

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  • 来源
    《Oxford Economic Papers》 |2011年第2期|p.254-278|共25页
  • 作者

    Fan Cui;

  • 作者单位

    School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Chaoyang District, Beijing, 100029, China;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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