...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Papers in regional science >Competition between highway operators: Can we expect toll differentiation?
【24h】

Competition between highway operators: Can we expect toll differentiation?

机译：高速公路运营商之间的竞争：我们可以期望收费差异吗？

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
   

获取外文期刊封面封底 >>

       
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Where there are alternative roads to the same destination, competition between profit maximising road operators is possible. Tolls on such roads could perform two welfare-enhancing functions: they discourage excessive driving and allocate drivers between roads. The second of these functions operates when some roads are more expensive to drive on, and less congested, than others. The Bertrand equilibrium will not always perform this second function; it may fail to allocate the most impatient drivers to less congested roads, as it does not always deliver toll differentiation. The performance of this second function is dependent on the first. That is, whether or not competing roads will be differentiated by tolls, and congestion will depend in part on the importance of discouraging marginal drivers. The equilibrium will not generally be fully efficient, but will often provide efficiency gains over other decentralised options.
机译：如果有通往同一目的地的替代道路，则可以在利润最大化的道路运营商之间进行竞争。这种道路上的通行费可以执行两项提高福利的功能：它们阻止过度驾驶，并在道路之间分配驾驶员。这些功能中的第二个功能在某些道路比其他道路行驶更昂贵且拥堵更少的情况下起作用。贝特朗平衡将不会总是执行第二项功能；它可能无法将最急躁的驾驶员分配到交通拥挤程度较低的道路上，因为它并不总是能够实现收费差异化。第二个功能的性能取决于第一个。就是说，竞争性道路是否会根据通行费来区分，而交通拥堵将部分取决于劝阻边际驾驶员的重要性。均衡通常不会完全有效，但通常会比其他分散式选择带来更高的效率。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号