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首页> 外文期刊>IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems >Selfish Grids: Game-Theoretic Modeling and NAS/PSA Benchmark Evaluation
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Selfish Grids: Game-Theoretic Modeling and NAS/PSA Benchmark Evaluation

机译：自私的网格：博弈论建模和NAS / PSA基准评估

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摘要

Selfish behaviors of individual machines in a Grid can potentially damage the performance of the system as a whole. However, scrutinizing the Grid by taking into account the noncooperativeness of machines is a largely unexplored research problem. In this paper, we first present a new hierarchical game-theoretic model of the Grid that matches well with the physical administrative structure in real-life situations. We then focus on the impact of selfishness in intrasite job execution mechanisms. Based on our novel utility functions, we analytically derive the Nash equilibrium and optimal strategies for the general case. To study the effects of different strategies, we have also performed extensive simulations by using a well-known practical scheduling algorithm over the NAS (Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation) and the PSA (Parameter Sweep Application) workloads. We have studied the overall job execution performance of the Grid system under a wide range of parameters. Specifically, we find that the Optimal selfish strategy significantly outperforms the Nash selfish strategy. Our performance evaluation results can serve as a valuable reference for designing appropriate strategies in a practical Grid.
机译：网格中单个计算机的自私行为可能潜在地损害整个系统的性能。但是，通过考虑机器的不合作性来仔细检查网格是一个很大程度上尚未探索的研究问题。在本文中，我们首先提出了一种新的网格分层博弈论模型，该模型与现实生活中的物理管理结构非常匹配。然后，我们集中于自私对站点内作业执行机制的影响。基于我们新颖的效用函数，我们可以分析得出纳什均衡和一般情况下的最优策略。为了研究不同策略的效果，我们还通过使用众所周知的实用调度算法对NAS（数值空气动力学仿真）和PSA（参数扫描应用程序）工作负载进行了广泛的仿真。我们已经研究了在各种参数下Grid系统的总体作业执行性能。具体来说，我们发现最优自私策略明显优于纳什自私策略。我们的性能评估结果可为在实际Grid中设计适当策略提供有价值的参考。

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