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A Truthful and Efficient Incentive Mechanism for Demand Response in Green Datacenters

机译:绿色数据中心需求响应的真实有效的激励机制

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Datacenter demand response is envisioned as a promising tool for mitigating operational stability issues faced by smart grids. It enables significant potentials in peak load reduction and facilitates the incorporation of distributed generation. Monetary refund from the smart grid can also alleviate the cloud's burden in escalating electricity cost. However, the current demand response paradigm is inefficient towards incentivizing a cloud service provider (CSP) that operates geo-distributed datacenters. To incentivize CSP participation, this work presents an auction mechanism that enables smart grids to voluntarily submit bids to the CSP to procure diverse amounts of demand response with different payments. To maximize the social welfare of the auction, the CSP that acts as the auctioneer needs to solve the winner determination problem at large-scale. By applying the proximal Jacobian alternating direction method of multipliers, we propose a distributed algorithm for each datacenter to solve a small-scale problem in a parallel fashion. Desirable properties of the proposed auction, such as social welfare maximization and truthfulness are achieved through Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payment. Through extensive evaluations based on real datacenter workload traces and IEEE 14-bus test systems, we demonstrate that our incentive mechanism constitutes a win-win mechanism for both the geo-distributed cloud and the smart grid.
机译:数据中心需求响应被设想为有前途的工具,用于减轻智能电网面临的操作稳定性问题。它能够降低峰值负荷减少的显着潜力,并有助于掺入分布式的发电。来自智能电网的货币退款也可以缓解云的负担升级电力成本。但是,当前需求响应范例对于激励操作地理分布式数据中心的云服务提供商(CSP)效率低下。为了激励CSP参与,这项工作提出了一种拍卖机制,使智能电网能够自愿提交CSP的投标,以采购不同付款的不同需求响应。为了最大限度地提高拍卖的社会福利,作为拍卖师的CSP需要在大规模上解决胜利者的决定问题。通过应用乘法器的近端雅可比交替方向方法,我们提出了一种分布式算法,每个数据中心以并行方式解决小规模问题。通过Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)付款实现了拟议拍卖的理想性质,例如社会福利最大化和真实性。通过基于真实数据中心工作量迹线和IEEE 14总线测试系统的广泛评估,我们证明我们的激励机制构成了地理分布式云和智能电网的双赢机制。

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