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SIM and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy and Haidt's Account of Moral Judgment

机译:SIM与城市:心理学和哲学的理性主义与海特对道德判断的描述

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摘要

Jonathan Haidt (2001) advances the 'Social Intuitionist' account of moral judgment, which he presents as an alternative to rationalist accounts of moral judgment, hitherto dominant in psychology. Here I consider Haidt's anti-rationalism and the debate that it has provoked in moral psychology, as well as some anti-rationalist philosophical claims that Haidt and others have grounded in the empirical work of Haidt and his collaborators. I will argue that although the case for anti-rationalism in moral psychology based on the work of Haidt and his collaborators is plausible, a decisive case has yet to be made. It will require further experimental evidence before a decisive case could be made. My assessment of anti-rationalist philosophical arguments that are grounded in the empirical work of Haidt and his collaborators is much more negative than this. I will argue that this body of empirical work is a very unpromising basis for such arguments.
机译:乔纳森·海特(Jonathan Haidt,2001)提出了对道德判断的“社会直觉主义者”解释,他提出了对道德判断的理性主义者解释的一种替代方法,该解释迄今在心理学中占主导地位。我在这里考虑海特的反理性主义及其在道德心理学中引起的争论,以及一些反理性主义的哲学主张,即海特及其他人基于海特及其合作者的经验工作。我将争辩说,尽管基于海特及其合作者的工作提出的在道德心理学上反理性主义的理由是合理的,但尚未做出决定性的案例。在做出决定性案例之前,将需要进一步的实验证据。我对基于Haidt和他的合作者的经验工作的反理性主义哲学论证的评价远比这更为负面。我将争辩说,这种实证研究是此类论证的非常没有希望的基础。

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