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Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts

机译:认知建筑与认知鸿沟:捍卫没有现象概念的物理学

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摘要

The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles within a given system which entails their functional unanalysability. These features together with the encapsulated nature of low level complex processes giving rise to unstructured sensory representations readily explain those peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness which are usually taken to pose a serious problem for contemporary physicalism. I conclude that if those concepts which are related to the phenomenal character of conscious experience are special in any way, their characteristics are derivative of and can be accounted for in terms of the cognitive and representational features introduced in the present paper.
机译:本文提出的新颖方法解决了认知鸿沟的发生,并在不依赖所谓现象现象概念的情况下捍卫了物理学家反对反物理学家的论点。焦点不再转移到概念特征上,而是转移到体验本身的特殊特征上。在这种情况下,提供的帐户是现象概念策略的替代方法。有人认为,通过较高的认知获得的某些感觉表征缺乏组成结构。非结构化表示可以在给定系统中自由交换其因果作用,从而导致它们的功能不可分析。这些特征与低水平复杂过程的封装性质一起导致了非结构化的感官表现,很容易解释那些现象意识的特殊性,这些特殊性通常被认为对当代物理学家构成了严重的问题。我得出的结论是,如果与意识体验的现象特征相关的那些概念在任何方面都是特殊的,则它们的特征是衍生的,并且可以根据本文介绍的认知和表征特征加以解释。

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