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(Not) Exercising Discretion: Environmental Planning and the Politics of Blame-Avoidance

机译:(不)行使自由裁量权:环境规划与避免责备的政治

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This paper uses Lipsky's classic formulation of “street-level bureaucracy” to explore the exercise of discretion by local policy practitioners in relation to a contaminated site in England. The policy literature generally assumes that practitioners seek to expand their discretion because this allows them to shape policy responses through the application of initiative and judgement. However, discretion is linked both to the degree of organisational and task complexity and to the level of uncertainty involved with making and implementing policy decisions. Such uncertainty affects practitioners’ behaviour. They may develop rules to manage uncertainty, thereby tempering discretion. And where policy options offer little prospect for claiming credit and ample opportunity for being subject to blame, policy implementers often adopt a cautious approach to decisions or avoid taking them. The paper illustrates how practitioners use non-decision-making tactics—such as diversion of responsibility and bureaucratic inertia—to minimise the potential for blame. This offers an extended interpretation of the uses of discretion by street-level bureaucrats.View full textDownload full textKeywordsBlame-avoidance, discretion, non-decision-making, street-level bureaucracyRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2012.728002
机译:本文使用Lipsky的“街道级官僚主义”的经典表述,来探索当地政策从业者对英国受污染场地的自由裁量权。政策文献通常假定从业者寻求扩大其自由裁量权,因为这使他们能够通过运用主动性和判断力来制定政策对策。但是,自由裁量权与组织和任务的复杂程度以及与制定和实施政策决策所涉及的不确定性程度有关。这种不确定性会影响从业者的行为。他们可能会制定规则来管理不确定性,从而降低自由裁量权。而且,在政策选择几乎无权主张信用的情况下,也没有足够的机会受到指责,政策实施者通常对决策采取谨慎的态度,或者避免做出决定。本文说明了从业人员如何使用非决策策略(例如转移责任和官僚惯性)来最大程度地减少应受指责的可能性。这提供了街道官僚机构对自由裁量权使用的扩展解释。 ::“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,美味,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,pubid:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2012.728002

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