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Market-Level Defense Against FDIA and a New LMP-Disguising Attack Strategy in Real-Time Market Operations

机译:对FDIA的市场水平防御和新的LMP伪装攻击战略在实时市场运营中

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摘要

Traditional cyberattack strategies on the electricity market only consider bypassing bad data detections. However, our analysis shows that experienced market operators can detect abnormal locational marginal prices (LMPs) under the traditional attack model during real-time (RT) operations, because such attack model ignores the characteristics of the LMP itself and leads to price spikes that can be an easy-to-detect signal of abnormality. A detection approach based on the concept of critical load level (CLL) is used to help operators identify risky periods when operators would be prone to overlooking abnormal LMPs. During safe periods, the abnormal LMPs are identified according to the operator's experience, while in risky CLL intervals, a N-x cyber contingency analysis is proposed to help independent system operators (ISOs) detect abnormal LMPs. Further, this paper constructs a new type of cyberattack strategy capable of not only bypassing bad data detection in the state estimation stage but also disguising the compromised LMPs as regular LMPs to avoid market operators' alerts in a realistic scenario wherein the attacker has imperfect information on system topology. Finally, the proposed analysis method and the attack strategy are evaluated through numerical studies on the PJM 5-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system.
机译:电力市场上的传统网络攻略策略仅考虑绕过糟糕的数据检测。然而,我们的分析表明,经验丰富的市场运营商在实时(RT)运营期间,经验丰富的市场运营商可以在传统攻击模型中检测异常的位置边际价格(LMP),因为这种攻击模型忽略了LMP本身的特征,并导致价格尖峰是一种易于检测的异常信号。一种基于临界负载级别(CLL)概念的检测方法用于帮助运营商识别运营商忽略异常LMP时识别风险时段。在安全时期,根据操作员的经验确定异常的LMP,而在危险的CLL间隔中,建议采用N-X网络应急分析来帮助独立系统运营商(ISOS)检测异常的LMP。此外,本文构建了一种新型的网络图克策略,该策略不仅可以绕过状态估计阶段绕过不良数据检测,而且还伪造受损的LMP作为常规LMP,以避免市场运营商在现实方案中的警报,其中攻击者具有不完美的信息系统拓扑。最后,通过PJM 5总线系统和IEEE 118总线系统的数值研究来评估所提出的分析方法和攻击策略。

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