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首页> 外文期刊>Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on >Recovery Mechanisms in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets With Non-Convexities—Part I: Design and Evaluation Methodology
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Recovery Mechanisms in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets With Non-Convexities—Part I: Design and Evaluation Methodology

机译：日前具有非凸性的电力市场中的恢复机制—第一部分：设计和评估方法

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摘要

In centralized day-ahead electricity markets with marginal pricing, unit commitment costs and capacity constraints give rise to non-convexities which may result in losses to some of the participating generating units. Therefore, a recovery mechanism is required to compensate them. In this paper, we present and analyze several recovery mechanisms that result in recovery payments after the market is cleared. Each of these mechanisms results in a different type and/or amount of payments for each participating unit that exhibits losses. We also propose a methodology for evaluating the bidding strategy behavior of the participating units for each mechanism. This methodology is based on the execution of a numerical procedure aimed at finding joint optimal bidding strategies of the profit-maximizing units. In a companion follow-up paper (Part II), we apply this methodology to evaluate the performance and incentive compatibility of the suggested recovery mechanisms on a simplified test case model of the Greek electricity market.
机译：在具有边际定价的集中式日间电力市场中，机组承诺成本和容量限制会导致不凸性，这可能导致某些参与发电的机组蒙受损失。因此，需要一种恢复机制来补偿它们。在本文中，我们介绍并分析了几种清算机制，这些机制导致市场清算后产生回收款。这些机制中的每一种都会导致出现亏损的每个参与单位的付款类型和/或金额不同。我们还提出了一种评估每种机制参与单位的出价策略行为的方法。该方法基于执行数字过程的目的，该过程旨在找到利润最大化单位的联合最优竞标策略。在随附的后续论文（第二部分）中，我们将这种方法应用于在希腊电力市场的简化测试案例模型上评估建议的恢复机制的性能和激励兼容性。

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