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首页> 外文期刊>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America >Risk of collective failure provides an escape from the tragedy of the commons
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Risk of collective failure provides an escape from the tragedy of the commons

机译：集体失败的风险使人们摆脱了公地的悲剧

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摘要

From group hunting to global warming, how to deal with collective action may be formulated in terms of a public goods game of cooperation. In most cases, contributions depend on the risk of future losses. Here, we introduce an evolutionary dynamics approach to a broad class of cooperation problems in which attempting to minimize future losses turns the risk of failure into a central issue in individual decisions. We find that decisions within small groups under high risk and stringent requirements to success significantly raise the chances of coordinating actions and escaping the tragedy of the commons. We also offer insights on the scale at which public goods problems of cooperation are best solved. Instead of large-scale endeavors involving most of the population, which as we argue, may be counterproductive to achieve cooperation, the joint combination of local agreements within groups that are small compared with the population at risk is prone to significantly raise the probability of success. In addition, our model predicts that, if one takes into consideration that groups of different sizes are interwoven in complex networks of contacts, the chances for global coordination in an overall cooperating state are further enhanced.
机译：从集体狩猎到全球变暖，如何应对集体行动可以通过公共利益合作博弈来制定。在大多数情况下，捐款取决于未来损失的风险。在这里，我们为广泛的合作问题引入了一种进化动力学方法，其中试图最小化未来损失将失败的风险变成单个决策中的中心问题。我们发现，在高风险和对成功的严格要求下的小团体内的决策显着增加了协调行动和逃避公地悲剧的机会。我们还提供关于最大程度地解决公共物品合作问题的见解。正如我们认为的那样，与大多数人口的大规模努力相反，这可能不利于达成合作，相反，与处于危险之中的人口相比，规模较小的群体内部的地方协议的联合组合很容易显着提高成功的可能性。 。另外，我们的模型预测，如果考虑到不同大小的组交织在复杂的联系人网络中，则在整体合作状态下进行全局协调的机会会进一步增加。

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  • 作者

    Francisco C. Santos; Jorge M. Pacheco;

  • 作者单位

    Departamento de Informatica and Centro de Inteligencia Artificial, Faculdade de Ciencias e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica,Portugal ,Applications of Theoretical Physics Group, Centro de Matematica e Aplicacoes Fundamentals, Instituto de Investigacao Interdisciplinar, P-1649-003Lisbon Codex, Portugal;

    Applications of Theoretical Physics Group, Centro de Matematica e Aplicacoes Fundamentals, Instituto de Investigacao Interdisciplinar, P-1649-003Lisbon Codex, Portugal,Departamento de Matematica e Aplicacoes, Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《生物学医学文摘》(MEDLINE);美国《化学文摘》(CA);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    climate change; collective risk; game theory;

    机译：气候变化;集体风险;博弈论;

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