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Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans

机译：集中制裁和合法授权促进人类合作

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Social sanctioning is widely considered a successful strategy to promote cooperation among humans. In situations in which in dividual and collective interests are at odds, incentives to free-ride induce individuals to refrain from contributing to public goods provision. Experimental evidence from public goods games shows that when endowed with sanctioning powers, conditional cooper ators can discipline defectors, thus leading to greater levels of cooperation. However, extant evidence is based on peer punish ment institutions, whereas in complex societies, systems of control are often centralized: for instance, we do not sanction our neighbors for driving too fast, the police do. Here we show the effect of cen tralized sanctioning and legitimate authority on cooperation. We designed an adaptation of the public goods game in which sanction ing power is given to a single monitor, and we experimentally ma nipulated the process by which the monitor is chosen. To increase the external validity of the study, we conducted lab-in-the-field experiments involving 1,543 Ugandan farmers from 50 producer cooperatives. This research provides evidence of the effectiveness of centralized sanctioning and demonstrates the causal effect of legitimacy on cooperation: participants are more responsive to the authority of an elected monitor than a randomly chosen monitor. Our essay contributes to the literature on the evolution of cooper ation by introducing the idea of role differentiation. In complex societies, cooperative behavior is not only sustained by mechanisms of selection and reciprocity among peers, but also by the legitimacy that certain actors derive from their position in the social hierarchy.
机译：社会制裁被广泛认为是促进人类之间合作的成功策略。在个人利益和集体利益相抵触的情况下，搭便车的诱因促使个人避免为公共物品的提供做出贡献。公共物品博弈的实验证据表明，有条件的合作者只要具备制裁权，就可以惩处叛逃者，从而提高合作水平。但是，现有的证据是基于同伴惩罚制度，而在复杂的社会中，控制系统通常是集中的：例如，我们不会因为开车太快而对邻居进行制裁，而警察则会这样做。在这里，我们展示了集中制裁和合法授权对合作的影响。我们设计了一种公共物品游戏的改编版，其中将制裁权赋予单个监视器，并且我们实验性地修正了选择监视器的过程。为了提高研究的外部有效性，我们进行了实地实验，涉及来自50个生产合作社的1,543名乌干达农民。这项研究为集中制裁的有效性提供了证据，并证明了合法性对合作的因果关系：与随机选择的监测员相比，参与者对民选监测员的权威更敏感。我们的文章通过介绍角色区分的思想，为合作发展的文献做出了贡献。在复杂的社会中，合作行为不仅由同伴之间的选择和互惠机制维持，而且还由某些行为者从其在社会等级制度中的地位所产生的合法性所维持。

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