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首页> 外文期刊>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America >Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity
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Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity

机译：表型相似性的合作进化

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摘要

The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals is a fascinating topic that has inspired much work in theoretical biology. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in a model where individuals are characterized by phenotypic properties that are visible to others. The population is well mixed in the sense that everyone is equally likely to interact with everyone else, but the behavioral strategies can depend on distance in phenotype space. We study the interaction of cooperators and defectors. In our model, cooperators cooperate with those who are similar and defect otherwise. Defectors always defect. Individuals mutate to nearby phenotypes, which generates a random walk of the population in phenotype space. Our analysis brings together ideas from coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain a precise condition for natural selection to favor cooperators over defectors. Cooperation is favored when the phenotypic mutation rate is large and the strategy mutation rate is small. In the optimal case for cooperators, in a one-dimensional phenotype space and for large population size, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is given by b/c = 1 + 2/3~(1/2). We also derive the fundamental condition for any two-strategy symmetric game and consider high-dimensional phenotype spaces.
机译：自私个体中合作的出现是一个引人入胜的话题，激发了许多理论生物学的研究。在这里，我们研究了一个模型中合作的演变过程，在模型中，个体具有他人可见的表型特征。从每个人同等可能与其他人进行交互的意义上讲，总体是混杂的，但是行为策略可能取决于表型空间中的距离。我们研究合作者和叛逃者的互动。在我们的模型中，合作者会与那些相似但有缺陷的人合作。叛逆者总是叛逃。个体突变为附近的表型，从而在表型空间中产生种群的随机游动。我们的分析汇集了来自合并理论和进化博弈动力学的思想。我们获得了自然选择的精确条件，有利于合作者胜过叛逃者。当表型突变率大而策略突变率小时，则有利于合作。在合作者的最佳情况下，在一维表型空间中并且对于较大的人口规模，关键的成本效益比由b / c = 1 + 2/3〜（1/2）给出。我们还推导了任何两策略对称博弈的基本条件，并考虑了高维表型空间。

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  • 作者

    Tibor Antal; Hisashi Ohtsuki; John Wakeley; Peter D. Taylor; Martin A. Nowak;

  • 作者单位

    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics and Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138;

    Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan Precursory Research for Embryonic Science and Technology, Japan Science and Technology Agency, Saitama 332-0012, Japan;

    Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138;

    Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada K7L 3N6;

    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics and Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada K7L 3N6;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《生物学医学文摘》(MEDLINE);美国《化学文摘》(CA);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    coalescent theory; evolutionary dynamics; evolutionary game theory; mathematical biology; stochastic process;

    机译：合并理论;进化动力学;进化博弈论;数学生物学随机过程;

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