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Manufacturer Rebate Competition in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

机译：共同零售商在供应链中的制造商回扣竞争

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摘要

We consider manufacturer rebate competition in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling to a common retailer. We fully characterize the manufacturers' equilibrium rebate decisions and show how they depend on parameters such as the fixed cost of a rebate program, market size, the redemption rate of rebate, the proportion of rebate-sensitive consumers in the market and competition intensity. Interestingly, more intense competition induces a manufacturer to lower rebate value or stop offering rebate entirely. Without rebate, it is known that more intense competition hurts the manufacturers and benefits the retailer. With rebate, however, more intense competition could benefit the manufacturers and hurt the retailer. We find similar counterintuitive results when there is a change in some other parameters. We also consider the case when the retailer subsidizes the manufacturers sequentially to offer rebate programs. We fully characterize the retailer's optimal subsidy strategy, and show that subsidy always benefits the retailer but may benefit or hurt the manufacturers. When the retailer wants to induce both manufacturers to offer rebate, he always prefers to subsidize the manufacturer with a higher fixed cost first. Sometimes the other manufacturer will then voluntarily offer rebate even without subsidy.
机译：我们考虑了供应链中的制造商回扣竞争，其中有两个相互竞争的制造商出售给同一家零售商。我们充分描述了制造商的均衡回扣决策，并展示了它们如何取决于诸如回扣计划的固定成本，市场规模，回扣的赎回率，对回扣敏感的消费者在市场中的比例以及竞争强度等参数。有趣的是，更激烈的竞争促使制造商降低返利价值或完全停止提供返利。没有回扣，众所周知，更激烈的竞争会损害制造商并使零售商受益。但是，有了回扣，更激烈的竞争可能会使制造商受益并损害零售商。当其他一些参数发生变化时，我们会发现类似的违反直觉的结果。我们还考虑了零售商按顺序补贴制造商以提供折扣计划的情况。我们充分描述了零售商的最佳补贴策略，并表明补贴总是使零售商受益，但可能使制造商受益或受到伤害。当零售商想要诱使两家制造商提供折扣时，他总是喜欢先以较高的固定成本补贴制造商。有时，其他制造商甚至会在没有补贴的情况下自愿提供折扣。

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