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Transparency in Buyer-Determined Auctions: Should Quality be Private or Public?

机译：买方确定的拍卖中的透明度：质量是私有的还是公开的？

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摘要

We study buyer-determined procurement auctions where both price and non-price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. Although, in scoring auctions bidders perfectly know how price and non-price attributes determine the awarding of the contract, this remains uncertain in buyer-determined auctions where the buyer is free to choose once all bids have been submitted. We analyze the impact of information bidders have with respect to the buyer's awarding decision. As we show theoretically whether it is in the buyer's interest to conceal the impact of non-price characteristics depends on how important the quality aspects of the procured good are to the buyer: The more important quality aspects are, the more interesting concealment becomes. In a counterfactual analysis using data from a large European procurement platform, we analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. Confirming our hypothesis, for auction categories where bidders' non-price characteristics strongly influence buyers' decisions concealment of non-price information leads to an increase in buyers' surplus of up to 15% due to higher competitive pressure and lower bids. Conversely, for categories where bidders' non-price characteristics are of little importance concealment of non-price information leads to a decrease in buyers' surplus of up to 6%.
机译：我们研究买方确定的采购拍卖，在这些拍卖中，投标人的价格和非价格特征都与授予合同有关。尽管在计分拍卖中，投标人完全知道价格和非价格属性如何决定合同的授予，但这在买方确定的拍卖中仍然不确定，在买方确定的拍卖中，一旦提交所有投标，买方便可以自由选择。我们分析信息竞标者对买方授予决定的影响。正如我们从理论上显示的那样，隐瞒非价格特征的影响是否符合买方的利益，取决于所采购商品的质量方面对买方的重要性：质量方面越重要，隐瞒就越有趣。在使用来自大型欧洲采购平台的数据进行的反事实分析中，我们分析了可供投标人使用的非价格信息的减少情况。证实我们的假设，对于拍卖类别，其中投标人的非价格特征会强烈影响买方的决策，隐瞒非价格信息会导致买方盈余增加多达15％，这是由于更高的竞争压力和较低的出价所致。相反，对于投标人的非价格特征不太重要的类别，隐藏非价格信息会导致买方盈余减少多达6％。

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