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Policy Incentives for Dangerous (But Necessary) Operations

机译：危险（但必要）操作的政策激励措施

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摘要

In industries where firms perform dangerous (but necessary) operations, liability costsdue to potential harm to third partiescan be significant. Firms may therefore find it optimal to exit the market, and this may lead to an inefficiently low number of incumbents. A social planner can discourage exit by offering appropriately designed subsidies. Ex ante subsidies defray the costs associated with making operations safer (e.g., funds to subsidize the purchase of safety equipment). Ex post subsidies mitigate the financial damages caused by an accident (e.g., funds to defray the cost of cleaning up a toxic spill). We consider a model where (i) firms have private information about their ability to improve reliability and (ii) reliability investments are unobservable. We demonstrate that when the social value of reliability outweighs the benefit of increased competition, it is optimal to offer ex ante subsidies alone (i.e., to subsidize the cost of making operations safer). Conversely, when the benefits of competition outweigh the benefits of reliability, a combination of ex ante and ex post subsidies is optimal (i.e., not only to subsidize safer operations, but also to share the costs of a potential accident).
机译：在公司执行危险（但必要）操作的行业中，由于对第三方的潜在伤害而造成的责任成本可能很高。因此，企业可能会发现退出市场的最佳选择，这可能导致现有企业的效率低下。社会计划者可以通过提供适当设计的补贴来阻止退出。事前补贴支付了使运营更安全相关的成本（例如，用于补贴购买安全设备的资金）。事后补贴减轻了事故造成的经济损失（例如，用于支付清理有毒溢出物的费用的资金）。我们考虑一个模型，其中（i）公司拥有有关其提高可靠性能力的私人信息，并且（ii）不可观察到可靠性投资。我们证明，当可靠性的社会价值超过竞争加剧的好处时，最好单独提供事前补贴（即补贴使运营更安全的成本）。相反，当竞争的好处大于可靠性的好处时，事前和事后补贴的组合是最佳的（即，不仅是为了补贴更安全的运营，而且还要分担潜在事故的成本）。

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