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Supply Diagnostic Incentives under Endogenous Information Asymmetry

机译：内源性信息不对称下的供应诊断激励

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This paper develops a dyadic supply chain model with one buyer who contracts the manufacturing of a new product to a supplier. Due to the lack of experience in manufacturing, the extent of supply risk is unknown to both the buyer and supplier before the time of contract. However, after the contract is accepted, the supplier may invest in a diagnostic test to acquire information about his true reliability, and use this information when deciding on a process improvement effort. Using this setting, we identify both operational and strategic benefits and costs of the diagnostic test. Operationally, it helps the supplier to take the first-best level of improvement effort, which would increase efficiency of the total supply chain. Strategically, it enables the buyer to reduce the agency costs associated with implementing process improvement on the supplier. Besides these benefits, diagnostic test increases the degree of information asymmetry along the supply chain. This in turn provides the supplier with proprietary information, whose rent would be demanded from the buyer in equilibrium. Benefit-cost analysis reveals two key factors in determining the value of diagnostic test: (i) degree of endogenous information asymmetry between supply chain firms, and (ii) the relative cost of a diagnostic test with respect to process improvement cost. Our results indicate that when both are high, the mere presence of a diagnostic test can result in less reliable supply chain. This implies that when incentives are not properly aligned, information asymmetry amplified due to diagnostic test neutralizes all its benefits.
机译：本文与一个买方建立了二进式供应链模型，该买方将新产品的制造与供应商签订合同。由于缺乏制造经验，因此在签订合同之前，买卖双方都不知道供应风险的程度。但是，在合同被接受之后，供应商可能会投资进行诊断测试以获取有关其真实可靠性的信息，并在决定过程改进工作时使用此信息。使用此设置，我们可以确定诊断测试的运营和策略优势以及成本。在操作上，它可以帮助供应商采取最佳水平的改进​​工作，从而提高整个供应链的效率。从战略上讲，它使买方可以减少与对供应商实施流程改进相关的代理成本。除了这些优点之外，诊断测试还增加了整个供应链中信息的不对称程度。反过来，这为供应商提供了专有信息，在均衡状态下会向买方索要租金。效益成本分析揭示了确定诊断测试价值的两个关键因素：（i）供应链公司之间的内生信息不对称程度，以及（ii）诊断测试相对于流程改进成本的相对成本。我们的结果表明，当两者都很高时，仅进行诊断测试就可能导致供应链可靠性降低。这意味着，如果激励措施未得到适当调整，由于诊断测试而导致的信息不对称现象将抵消其所有好处。

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