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首页> 外文期刊>Public choice >Johann Graf Lambsdorff, The Institutional Economics Of Corruption And Reform: Theory, Evidence And Policycambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Xiv + 286 Pages. Usd 95.00 (cloth), 52.00 (paper)
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Johann Graf Lambsdorff, The Institutional Economics Of Corruption And Reform: Theory, Evidence And Policycambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Xiv + 286 Pages. Usd 95.00 (cloth), 52.00 (paper)

机译:Johann Graf Lambsdorff,《腐败与改革的制度经济学:理论,证据与政策》剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,2007年。Xiv + 286页。美元95.00(布),52.00(纸)

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摘要

In this book, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, who is the founder of the Corruption Perceptions Index treats corruption as a feature of public institutions, which has only recently been made the subject of a sustained scientific analysis. The goal of this book is not to provide readers with recipes on how to fight corruption, but to inspire the creation of anti-corruption policies.rnLambsdorff correctly argues that the fight against corruption is a new challenge that requires new answers. The invisible hand of competition brings about good markets but not good governance, which he shows in chapter 1. In chapter 2, he surveys some empirical evidence on anti-corruption, and in chapters 3 and 4 he explores the idea that the corrupt actors' lack of commitment to honesty is at the core of the welfare losses of both bureaucratic and political corruption. In these two chapters he provides readers with an up-to-date assessment of research, both empirically and theoretically. In chapter 5, he contrasts corruption with the more competitive and transparent lobbying and argues, contradicting older viewpoints, that corruption represents the more harmful type of rent-seeking. In chapter 6, Lambsdorff shows how in practice corrupt actors attempt to secure reciprocity.
机译:在这本书中,腐败感知指数的创始人约翰·格拉夫·兰姆斯多夫(Johann Graf Lambsdorff)将腐败视为公共机构的特征,直到最近才将其作为持续科学分析的主题。本书的目的不是为读者提供有关如何打击腐败的秘诀,而是要激发制定反腐败政策。rnLambsdorff正确地指出,反腐败斗争是一项新的挑战,需要新的答案。竞争的无形力量带来了良好的市场,但没有带来良好的治理,这在第一章中进行了展示。在第二章中,他调查了反腐败的一些经验证据,在第三章和第四章中,他探讨了腐败行为者的腐败行为。缺乏对诚实的承诺是官僚和政治腐败造成的福利损失的核心。在这两章中,他从经验和理论上为读者提供了最新的研究评估。在第5章中,他将腐败与更具竞争性和透明度的游说进行了对比,并与较早的观点相反,认为腐败代表了更为有害的寻租类型。在第六章中,兰姆斯多夫(Lambsdorff)展示了腐败行为者在实践中如何努力确保对等。

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