...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Public performance & management review >Committed to Reciprocate on a Bribe or Blow the Whistle: The Effects of Periodical Staff-Rotation in Public Administration
【24h】

Committed to Reciprocate on a Bribe or Blow the Whistle: The Effects of Periodical Staff-Rotation in Public Administration

机译：致力于贿赂或吹口哨：期刊员工 - 旋转在公共行政方面的影响

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anti-corruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but reduces the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions due to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.
机译：在公共行政的员工的定期旋转可能导致腐败更低，因为它扰乱了公共官员和潜在贿赂之间的长期关系。 我们使用实验设计来测试员工轮换的反腐败效应，公职人员致力于往复贿赂。 我们发现员工轮换不会影响提供贿赂的公司的比例，但减少了贿赂接受和效率导致的效率效率的份额。 工作人员轮换处理的结果，即使官员很少接受贿赂的公司也是贿赂，这与具有量子响应均衡的游戏一致。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号