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首页> 外文期刊>The quarterly review of economics and finance >Political institutions and finance-growth nexus in emerging markets and developing countries: A tale of one threshold
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Political institutions and finance-growth nexus in emerging markets and developing countries: A tale of one threshold

机译：新兴市场和发展中国家的政治机构和金融 - 增长Nexus：一个门槛的故事

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The empirical evidence predicts that political institutions are the core component of institutional matrix. They set stages for other institutions to be devised and influence the economic growth. Applying Kre-mer et al.'s (2013) dynamic panel threshold regression to a selected panel of 77 emerging market and developing countries over the period 1976-2010, we provide compelling evidence in favor of a split base on political institutions in the finance-growth nexus. The asymmetric impact of institutions on growth sets in around the optimum threshold level, Minimizing political risks through improvement in the quality of political institutions can improve the growth dividend due to financial development. Our empirical results appear to be robust across a wide range of alternative empirical strategies, several new disaggregate measures of political institutions, and also when addressing the endogeneity issues of the regressors.
机译：经验证据预测，政治机构是机构矩阵的核心组成部分。他们为其他机构设定了待命和影响经济增长的阶段。应用KRE-MER等人。（2013）1976 - 2010年期间77个新兴市场和发展中国家所选专家的动态面板阈值回归，我们提供了令人信服的证据，有利于融资中政治机构的分裂基础-Growth Nexus。机构对增长的不对称影响围绕最佳阈值水平，通过改善政治机构的质量的改善最大限度地减少政治风险可以提高由于金融发展导致的增长股息。我们的经验结果似乎涉及各种替代实证策略，政治机构的几项新分解措施，以及在解决回归者的内部性问题时。

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