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首页> 外文期刊>The quarterly review of economics and finance >Active risk management and loan contract terms: Evidence from rated microfinance institutions
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Active risk management and loan contract terms: Evidence from rated microfinance institutions

机译：积极的风险管理和贷款合同条款：获得评级的小额信贷机构的证据

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The aim of this article is to test the relationship among organizational architecture, joint liabilities contracts, and loan conditions. Based on a sample of 135 MFIs rated between 2003 and 2008, the study shows that solidarity lending and a decentralized credit decision have no significant influence on loan conditions. Being a village bank lender is significantly associated with higher interest rates charged, higher outreach, lower depth of outreach, and higher transaction costs. Results seem to highlight the existence of a trade-off between outreach and the average loan size per borrower when MFIs decentralize credit decisions or establish joint liability contracts.
机译：本文的目的是测试组织架构，连带责任合同和贷款条件之间的关系。根据2003年至2008年评级的135家小额信贷机构的样本，研究表明，团结互助贷款和分散的信贷决策对贷款条件没有重大影响。成为村镇银行放款人与较高的利率，较高的覆盖范围，较低的覆盖范围以及较高的交易成本密切相关。结果似乎突出表明，当小额信贷机构分散信贷决定或建立连带责任合同时，在外展与每个借款人的平均贷款规模之间存在权衡。

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