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首页> 外文期刊>The quarterly review of economics and finance >Cross-listing in the U.S. and domestic investor protection
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Cross-listing in the U.S. and domestic investor protection

机译：在美国交叉上市和国内投资者保护

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Using the change in ordinary dividend payout as a proxy for improved governance, we show that cross-listing in the U.S. is associated with enhanced protection for the minority ordinary shareholders of exchange-listed non-U.S. firms. These firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance. We find no such effect for Rule 144a Portal firms. Interestingly, we document evidence inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis for Level 1 OTC firms. We believe that their ability to pay lower dividends post-listing is primarily due to their ability to credibly commit to fair treatment of their minority investors, given their record for equitable treatment of their ordinary shareholders. They achieve this reputation by consistently paying out a sizable proportion of their earnings as dividends. In addition, we find that the firm-level governance of Level 1 OTC firms, as measured by the number of closely held shares improves in the post-listing period. We find no such effect for SEC Rule 144a traded firms. Our results have also important implications for the agency models of dividends.
机译：使用普通股利支付的变化作为改进治理的代理，我们表明，在美国交叉上市与增强对交易所上市非美国公司的少数普通股股东的保护有关。这些公司用股息代替加强治理。对于规则144a门户网站公司，我们没有发现这样的影响。有趣的是，我们记录了与一级OTC公司的法律约束假设不一致的证据。我们认为，鉴于其对普通股股东的公平对待记录，他们在上市后支付较低股息的能力主要是由于他们有能力切实承诺公平对待其少数股东。他们通过持续将相当一部分收益作为股息来获得这种声誉。此外，我们发现，以上市公司持股数量衡量，一级场外交易公司的公司级治理在上市后时期有所改善。我们发现，对SEC规则144a交易的公司没有这种影响。我们的结果对股息代理模型也具有重要意义。

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