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MARKET CLEARING PRICE AND EQUILIBRIA OF THE PROGRESSIVE SECOND PRICE MECHANISM

机译:市场清算价格和渐进第二价格机制的均衡

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摘要

The Progressive Second Price mechanism (PSP), recently introduced by Lazax and Semret to share an infinitely-divisible resource among users through pricing, has been shown to verify very interesting properties. Indeed, the incentive compatibility property of that scheme, and the convergence to an efficient resource allocation where established, using the framework of Game Theory. Therefore, that auction-based allocation and pricing scheme seems particularly well-suited to solve congestion problems in telecommunication networks, where the resource to share is the available bandwidth on a link. This paper aims at supplementing the existing results by highlighting some properties of the different equilibria that can be reached. We precisely characterize the possible outcomes of the PSP auction game in terms of players bid price: when the bid fee (cost of a bid update) tends to zero then the bid price of all users at equilibrium gets close to the so-called market clearing price of the resource. Therefore, observing an equilibrium of the PSP auction game gives some accurate information about the market clearing price of the resource.
机译:Lazax和Semret最近引入了渐进式第二价格机制(PSP),以通过定价在用户之间共享无限可分割的资源,该机制已被证明可以验证非常有趣的属性。实际上,使用博弈论的框架,该方案具有激励兼容性,并且可以收敛到有效资源分配的位置。因此,这种基于拍卖的分配和定价方案似乎特别适合解决电信网络中的拥塞问题,因为要共享的资源是链路上的可用带宽。本文旨在通过强调可以达到的不同平衡的一些性质来补充现有的结果。我们用玩家竞标价格来精确描述PSP拍卖游戏的可能结果:当竞标费(竞标更新成本)趋于零时,处于平衡状态的所有用户的竞标价格都接近所谓的市场清算资源价格。因此,观察PSP拍卖博弈的平衡可以得出有关资源市场清算价格的一些准确信息。

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