首页> 外文期刊>RAIRO Operation Research >MODELLING PRICING, VERTICAL CO-OP ADVERTISING AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN A NON-COOPERATIVE THREE-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN USING GAME THEORY APPROACH
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MODELLING PRICING, VERTICAL CO-OP ADVERTISING AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN A NON-COOPERATIVE THREE-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN USING GAME THEORY APPROACH

机译:基于博弈论的非合作三层供应链建模定价,垂直合作广告和质量提升

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Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is one of the well-known mechanisms for coordination of supply chains. Vertical co-op advertising is a financial agreement in which a member of the chain pays certain percentage (i.e. cooperation rate) of a subsequent member's advertisement cost. Since increasing the number of echelons and decision variables in supply chain problems increase the modelling and computational complexity, most researchers study vertical co-op advertising in a two-level supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer. This paper investigates the problem by considering price and quality levels as additional decision variables in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one retailer. The ultimate goal is to show supply chain managers the importance of product quality as well the role of local advertisement in positively influencing market demand on top of the traditional approach of speed and efficiency optimization. Using game theory approach, power of the manufacturer is assumed to be higher than or equal to those of others in the chain. Five different relationships between players are considered in five non-cooperative games (named as G1-G5) and equilibrium solutions are extracted for each. The results show that the manufacturer prefers to play Stackelberg with the retailer and the supplier rather than be in conflict with them in Nash game. Such preference can lead manufacturer towards high quality and cost-efficient product/service via efficient advertisement in our complex network of business firms.
机译:垂直合作(合作社)广告是协调供应链的著名机制之一。垂直合作广告是一种财务协议,其中链的成员支付后续成员广告费用的一定百分比(即合作率)。由于供应链问题中梯队和决策变量数量的增加会增加建模和计算的复杂性,因此大多数研究人员都在包括制造商和零售商在内的两级供应链中研究垂直合作广告。本文通过将价格和质量水平作为三级供应链(包括一个供应商,一个制造商和一个零售商)中的附加决策变量,来研究此问题。最终目标是向供应链管理者展示产品质量的重要性以及本地广告在传统的速度和效率优化方法之上对积极影响市场需求的作用。使用博弈论方法,假定制造商的能力高于或等于链中其他成员的能力。在五个非合作博弈(称为G1-G5)中考虑了参与者之间的五个不同关系,并为每个博弈提取了平衡解。结果表明,制造商更喜欢与零售商和供应商一起玩Stackelberg,而不是在Nash游戏中与他们发生冲突。通过在我们复杂的商业公司网络中进行有效的广告宣传,这种偏好可以引导制造商朝着高质量和高性价比的产品/服务方向发展。

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