Commuting, congestion tolls and the structure of the labour market: Optimal congestion pricing in a wage bargaining model

Bruno De Borger

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Commuting, congestion tolls and the structure of the labour market: Optimal congestion pricing in a wage bargaining model

机译：通勤，交通拥堵和劳动力市场的结构：工资谈判模型中的最佳交通拥堵定价

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In this paper we study optimal congestion pricing in a wage bargaining model. We first show that, compared to a competitive labour market environment, wage bargaining may lead to substantially different optimal transport taxes. Second, bargaining implies that exogenous increases in congestion levels and in transport taxes raise negotiated wages and reduce employment levels; the strength of these effects depends on the union's attitude towards transport issues. Third, we show that the optimal uniform transport tax positively depends on the impact of congestion on negotiated wages, and negatively on the wage effects of the congestion tax itself. Using a standard specification for union preferences, the optimal transport tax exceeds the marginal external congestion cost to the extent that transport flows include demand by people who have no employment. Finally, if taxes can be differentiated according to trip purpose, the tax structure implies shifting the tax burden away from the employed.

机译：在本文中，我们研究了工资谈判模型中的最优拥堵定价。我们首先表明，与竞争性的劳动力市场环境相比，工资讨价还价可能会导致最优运输税大不相同。第二，讨价还价意味着交通拥挤水平和运输税的外生性增长提高了谈判工资并降低了就业水平；这些影响的强度取决于工会对运输问题的态度。第三，我们表明最优统一运输税正面地取决于交通拥挤对协商工资的影响，而负面地取决于交通拥挤税本身的工资影响。使用针对工会优惠的标准规范，最佳的运输税超过了边际外部拥堵成本，其程度是运输流包括无工作人员的需求。最后，如果可以根据旅行目的区分税收，则税收结构意味着将税收负担从工作人员身上转移开。

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来源
《Regional science and urban economics》 |2009年第4期|434-448|共15页
作者
Bruno De Borger;
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作者单位

Department of Economics, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium;

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原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
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关键词
wage bargaining; congestion pricing; commuting;

机译：工资谈判;拥堵定价;通勤;

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1. The structure of the labor market, telecommuting, and optimal peak period congestion tolls: A numerical optimization model [J] . Bruno De Borger, Bart Wuyts Regional science and urban economics . 2011,第5期

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2. Second-best congestion pricing in general networks. Heuristic algorithms for finding second-best optimal Toll levels and toll levels and toll points [J] . Erik T.Verhoef Transportation Research Part B: Methodological . 2002,第8期

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3. Optimal toll locations and toll levels in congestion pricing schemes: a case study of Stockholm [J] . Joakim Ekstroem, Leonid Engelson, Clas Rydergren Transportation planning and technology . 2014,第4期

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机译：双向拍卖市场结构中用于优化定价和拥堵管理的OPF工具
5. Congestion toll pricing models and methods for variable demand networks. [D] . Yildirim, Mehmet Bayram. 2001

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6. Beyond Commuting: Ignoring Individuals’ Activity-Travel Patterns May Lead to Inaccurate Assessments of Their Exposure to Traffic Congestion [O] . Junghwan Kim, Mei-Po Kwan 2019

机译：超越通勤：忽略个人的活动-出行方式可能会导致对交通拥堵暴露的评估不准确
7. We analyze, in this paper, a DSGE New Keynesian model with indi- visible labor where firms may belong to two different final goods producing sectors one where wages and employment are determined in competitive labor markets and the orther where wages and employment are the result of a contractual process between unions and firms. Bargaining between firms and monopoly unions implies real wage rigidity in the model and, in turn, an endogenous trade-off between output stabilization and infla- tion stabilization. We show that the negative effect of a productivity shock on inflation and the positive effect of a cost-push shock is crucially determined by the proportion of firms that belong to the competitive sec- tor. The larger is this number, the smaller are these effects. We derive a welfare based objective function as a second order Taylor approxima- tion of the expected utility of the economy's representative agent and we analyze optimal monetary policy. We show that the larger is the num- ber of firms that belong to the competitive sector, the smaller should be the response of the nominal interest rate to exogenous productivity and cost-push shocks. If we consider, however, an instrument rule where the interest rate must react to inflationary expectations, the rule is not af- fected by the structure of the labor market. The results of the model are consistent with a well known empirical regularity in macroeconomics, i.e. that employment volatility is larger than real wage volatility. [O] . Lorenza Rossi, Fabrizio Mattesini 100

机译：在本文中，我们分析了DsGE新凯恩斯主义模型，该模型具有明显的劳动力，其中企业可能属于两个不同的最终产品生产部门，其中工资和就业是在竞争性劳动力市场中确定的，而工资和就业是由工资和就业导致的。工会和公司之间的合同过程。企业和垄断联盟之间的讨价还价意味着模型中的实际工资刚性，反过来，产出稳定和通货膨胀稳定之间的内生权衡。我们表明，生产率冲击对通货膨胀的负面影响以及成本推动冲击的积极影响，主要取决于属于竞争部门的企业比例。这个数字越大，这些效果越小。我们得出一个基于福利的目标函数作为经济代理人的预期效用的二阶泰勒近似，我们分析最优货币政策。我们表明，属于竞争性行业的企业数量越大，名义利率对外生生产率和成本推动冲击的反应就越小。但是，如果我们考虑利率必须对通胀预期作出反应的工具规则，则该规则不受劳动力市场结构的影响。该模型的结果与宏观经济学中众所周知的经验规律一致，即就业波动率大于实际工资波动率。

Commuting, congestion tolls and the structure of the labour market: Optimal congestion pricing in a wage bargaining model

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