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Analysis of extended warranties for medical equipment: A Stackelberg game model using priority queues

机译:医疗设备的扩展保修分析:使用优先级队列的Stackelberg游戏模型

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摘要

Healthcare institutions make use of technology-intensive equipment that follows tight quality standards. These companies aim at ensuring service continuity and safety of patients. In this context, maintenance services are generally performed exclusively by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) because it detains the required expertise, tools and spare parts. Then, we here propose a model to analyze the interaction among hospitals and OEM. We consider the OEM can provide maintenance services for two different classes of hospitals, which have the option of either hiring an Extended Warranty (EW) or paying for each maintenance intervention on demand with or without priority. Class 1 customers are often large hospitals, whereas institutions of class 2 are generally small/medium ones, which have shorter budgets, and thus would choose a non-priority option. To that end, we adopt a Stackelberg game, where the OEM is the leader and the customer is the follower. Failures and repairs follow a 2-class G/M/1 priority queuing system. The OEM maximizes its expected profit by setting the EW and repair intervention prices, and selecting the optimal number of customers in each class. An application example is used to demonstrate the proposed model; a sensitivity analysis is also performed. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:医疗机构使用遵循严格质量标准的技术密集型设备。这些公司旨在确保患者的服务连续性和安全性。在这种情况下,维护服务通常由原始设备制造商(OEM)专门提供,因为它保留了所需的专业知识,工具和备件。然后,我们在这里提出一个模型来分析医院和OEM之间的交互。我们认为OEM可以为两家不同类别的医院提供维护服务,它们可以选择延长保修期(EW),也可以根据需要按优先级或不按优先级支付每次维护干预费用。 1级客户通常是大型医院,而2级机构通常是中/小型医院,它们的预算较短,因此会选择非优先级选项。为此,我们采用了Stackelberg游戏,其中OEM是领导者,客户是跟随者。故障和维修遵循2级G / M / 1优先级排队系统。 OEM通过设置电子战和维修干预价格,并在每个类别中选择最佳的客户数量,来最大化其预期利润。一个应用实例用来说明所提出的模型。还进行了灵敏度分析。 (C)2017 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Reliability Engineering & System Safety》 |2017年第12期|338-354|共17页
  • 作者单位

    Univ Fed Pernambuco, CEERMA Ctr Risk Anal Reliabil & Environm Modeling, Recife, PE, Brazil|Univ Fed Pernambuco, Dept Prod Engn, Rua Acad Helio Ramos S-N,Cidade Univ, BR-50740530 Recife, PE, Brazil|Univ Chile, Mech Engn Dept, Santiago, Chile|Univ Maryland, Dept Mech Engn, Ctr Risk & Reliabil, College Pk, MD 20742 USA;

    Univ Fed Pernambuco, CEERMA Ctr Risk Anal Reliabil & Environm Modeling, Recife, PE, Brazil|Univ Fed Pernambuco, Dept Prod Engn, Rua Acad Helio Ramos S-N,Cidade Univ, BR-50740530 Recife, PE, Brazil;

    Univ Fed Pernambuco, CEERMA Ctr Risk Anal Reliabil & Environm Modeling, Recife, PE, Brazil|Univ Fed Pernambuco, Dept Prod Engn, Rua Acad Helio Ramos S-N,Cidade Univ, BR-50740530 Recife, PE, Brazil;

    Univ Fed Pernambuco, CEERMA Ctr Risk Anal Reliabil & Environm Modeling, Recife, PE, Brazil|Univ Fed Pernambuco, Dept Prod Engn, Rua Acad Helio Ramos S-N,Cidade Univ, BR-50740530 Recife, PE, Brazil;

    Univ Fed Pernambuco, CEERMA Ctr Risk Anal Reliabil & Environm Modeling, Recife, PE, Brazil|Univ Fed Pernambuco, Dept Prod Engn, Rua Acad Helio Ramos S-N,Cidade Univ, BR-50740530 Recife, PE, Brazil;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Maintenance services; Medical equipment; Extended warranty; Stackelberg Game; Priority Queues;

    机译:维修服务;医疗设备;延长保修;Stackelberg游戏;优先队列;

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