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Social welfare maximization with the least subsidy: Photovoltaic supply chain equilibrium and coordination with fairness concern

机译：补贴最少的社会福利最大化：光伏供应链的平衡与公平问题的协调

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This study attempts to fill the literature gaps in the PV supply chain studies to understand better the effective equilibrium and coordination mechanisms in a PV supply chain with the fairness concern under the government subsidy policy and how an optimal subsidy factor is determined to achieve the social welfare maximization goal. Considering the government subsidy and the fairness concern of the core supply chain members, four basic game-theoretical model types (i.e. MS-leader Stackelberg Game, PA leader Stackelberg Game, Nash Game and Revenue Sharing Contract) are formulated to study and compare the effects on the solutions and the performances by undertaking either an equilibrium or a coordination supply chain strategy. A total of 16 models are developed for the analytical and numerical studies with the findings and results complementing each other. It is found that a conflicting goal exists between the public sector and the private sector to develop a larger and healthier PV industry. A coordinated supply chain, theoretically, would perform better than an equilibrium supply chain since a coordination strategy in a PV supply chain allows the maximization of the social welfare using the least public subsidy and, simultaneously, generates many more supply chain profits for the PV supply chain comparing to the profits earned by those supply chain strategies without any subsidy. Smart and proper policies to resolve the conflict between the public and the private sectors are still very deficient and need more practical investigations. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：本研究试图填补光伏供应链研究中的文献空白，以更好地理解政府补贴政策下对公平问题的关注，从而更好地理解光伏供应链中的有效均衡和协调机制，以及如何确定实现社会福利的最佳补贴因素。最大化目标。考虑到政府补贴和核心供应链成员的公平性，制定了四种基本的博弈论模型类型（即MS领导者Stackelberg游戏，PA领导者Stackelberg游戏，Nash游戏和收益共享合同）来研究和比较效果通过采取平衡或协调的供应链策略来解决方案和绩效。总共开发了16个用于分析和数值研究的模型，其发现和结果相互补充。发现在公共部门和私营部门之间存在一个矛盾的目标，即发展更大，更健康的光伏产业。从理论上讲，协调的供应链将比均衡的供应链表现更好，因为光伏供应链中的协调策略允许使用最少的公共补贴最大化社会福利，并同时为光伏供应产生更多的供应链利润与那些没有任何补贴的供应链策略所获得的利润进行比较。解决公共与私营部门之间冲突的明智而适当的政策仍然非常匮乏，需要进行更实际的调查。 （C）2018 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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