• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Research in International Business and Finance >Ownership structure and investment decisions of Chinese SOEs
【24h】

Ownership structure and investment decisions of Chinese SOEs

机译：中国国有企业的所有权结构和投资决策

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In this paper we examine the relation between ownership structure and overinvestment decisions by Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs). We hypothesize that state owners, the largest block holders, are more committed to pursue their own sociopolitical agenda than maximizing wealth of its shareholders and show that the relation between state ownership and overinvestment is positive. We also hypothesize that managerial owners, who too receive non-negotiable shares, would discourage overinvestment lest it should inhibit the firm's ability to pay dividends. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find a negative relation between management ownership and overinvestment. Conversely, our results show that the state ownership has a negative impact while managerial ownership has a positive effect on underinvestment decisions.
机译：在本文中，我们研究了中国国有企业（SOE）的所有权结构和过度投资决策之间的关系。我们假设最大的大宗国有企业所有者比追求最大的股东财富更致力于追求自己的社会政治议程，并表明国有企业与过度投资之间的关系是积极的。我们还假设，同样获得不可转让股份的管理所有者也会阻止过度投资，以免抑制公司支付股息的能力。与此假设一致，我们发现管理层所有权与过度投资之间存在负相关关系。相反，我们的结果表明，国有所有权对投资不足的决策具有负面影响，而管理所有权对投资不足的决策具有积极影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号