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Contractual governance and the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms: Evidence on technology licensing

机译：合同治理和争端解决机制的选择：技术许可的证据

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摘要

In fast-paced and knowledge-intensive environments, licensing partnerships can be powerful levers for market expansion. Research on the management of technology-oriented licenses has nonetheless pointed out the risks of corrosive disputes caused by conflicting interests or misunderstandings among licensing partners. The choice madeex anteon mechanisms for resolving potential disputes is of prime importance in the execution of licensing exchanges. Although the legal literature has widely emphasized the advantages of arbitration towards litigation, public ordering remains the “default” option in managers’ eyes. By adopting a transaction cost economics logic, our study explores the conditions under which licensing partners may prefer arbitration over public ordering during the contractual-design phase. In accordance with our theoretical arguments, findings show that the occurrence of arbitration provisions increases when the coordination orientation adopted by licensing partners is extensive. In situations where both monitoring and coordination orientations are simultaneously extensive, results reveal a greater propensity to prefer arbitration over public ordering. Our research therefore supports the view that corporate decision-makers tend to favor the conciliatory stance and compromising awards typically associated with arbitration, only when exchanges are expected to be highly coordinative. Their preference for arbitration over litigation is magnified when the coordination orientation develops alongside the monitoring orientation.
机译：在快节奏且知识密集的环境中，许可合作伙伴关系可以成为扩展市场的强大杠杆。尽管如此，有关技术导向型许可证管理的研究指出了由许可方之间的利益冲突或误解引起的腐蚀性纠纷的风险。为解决潜在纠纷，选择madeex anteon机制对于执行许可交换至关重要。尽管法律文献广泛强调了仲裁对诉讼的好处，但公共秩序仍然是管理者眼中的“默认”选择。通过采用交易成本经济学的逻辑，我们的研究探索了在合同设计阶段许可合作伙伴可能更喜欢仲裁而不是公共秩序的条件。根据我们的理论论证，研究结果表明，当许可合作伙伴采用的协调方向广泛时，仲裁条款的发生率就会增加。在同时开展监督和协调工作的情况下，结果表明，与公共秩序相比，更倾向于仲裁。因此，我们的研究支持这样一种观点，即只有在期望交流高度协调的情况下，公司决策者才会倾向于调解立场，并且通常会损害与仲裁相关的裁决。当协调方向与监视方向同时发展时，他们倾向于仲裁而不是诉讼。

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