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Fishing for excuses and performance evaluation

机译：钓鱼找借口和绩效评估

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摘要

We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a convincing case requires time, time that is not spent on exerting productive effort and thus generating information represents an opportunity cost. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the principal to prefer a policy of adjusting ex post the performance measure for the information provided by the agent to a policy of conforming to a result-based system with no adjustments. The risk aversion and a possible limited liability of the agent play an important role in the analysis. This paper clarifies the issues associated with the so-called "excuse culture" prevailing in some organizations.
机译：我们研究了委托代理模型，在该模型中，代理可以提供事后有关其绩效的其他相关信息。特别是，他可以提供正当的借口，即证明结果不佳仅归因于他无法控制的因素。但是，建立有说服力的案例需要时间，而时间不花在进行生产性努力上，因此生成信息表示机会成本。我们为委托人获得了必要和充分的条件，他们倾向于在事后对代理提供的信息进行绩效衡量的基础上进行调整，而不是遵循基于结果的系统而不进行调整的策略。代理人的风险规避和可能的有限责任在分析中起着重要作用。本文阐明了与某些组织中普遍存在的所谓“借口文化”相关的问题。

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