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首页> 外文期刊>Review of development economics >Need, Merit and Politics in Multilateral Aid Allocation: A District-level Analysis of World Bank Projects in India
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Need, Merit and Politics in Multilateral Aid Allocation: A District-level Analysis of World Bank Projects in India

机译：多边援助分配中的需求，价值和政治：印度世界银行项目的地区层面分析

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摘要

We assess the targeting of foreign aid within recipient countries by employing Poisson estimations on the determinants of the World Bank's allocation of project aid at the district level in India. The evidence of needs-based location choices is very weak as long as the poverty orientation of overall commitments is taken as the yardstick. It is only for some sectors that we find stronger indications of needs-based allocation when combining sector-specific commitments with corresponding measures of need. The evidence for a merit-based allocation of World Bank aid is even weaker. We typically do not find evidence that aid allocation is affected by political patronage at the state or district level. However, the World Bank prefers districts where foreign direct investors may benefit from projects related to infrastructure.
机译：我们通过对世界银行在印度的地区级项目援助分配的决定因素进行泊松估计，来评估受援国对外国援助的针对性。只要以总体承诺的贫困取向为准绳，基于需求的选址的证据就非常薄弱。只有将某些部门的承诺与相应的需求度量相结合时，我们才发现对于某些部门的更有力指示，即基于需求的分配。按功绩分配世界银行援助的证据更加薄弱。我们通常找不到证据表明援助分配受州或地区一级政治支持的影响。但是，世界银行偏爱外国直接投资者可从与基础设施相关的项目中受益的地区。

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