首页> 外文期刊>Review of international economics >Vertically Related Markets, Foreign Competition and Optimal Privatization Policy
【24h】

Vertically Related Markets, Foreign Competition and Optimal Privatization Policy

机译:纵向相关市场,外国竞争和最优私有化政策

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

This paper examines the optimal privatization policy in vertically related markets in which an upstream public firm competes with a foreign private rival in supplying a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms competing in the domestic market. It shows that if the upstream public firm's market share is sufficiently high, full nationalization is optimal and the resulting profit margin is positive. However, complete privatization is never optimal. Numerical simulations reveal both the diverse optimal privatization regimes and the patterns of optimal privatization levels with varying numbers of the domestic and foreign downstream firms.
机译:本文研究了垂直相关市场中的最佳私有化政策,在该政策中,上游公共公司与外国私人竞争对手竞争,向在国内市场竞争的国内外下游公司提供生产投入。它表明,如果上游上市公司的市场份额足够高,则完全国有化是最优的,由此产生的利润率为正。但是,完全私有化绝不是最佳选择。数值模拟揭示了多样化的最优私有化制度和最优私有化水平的模式,其中国内和国外下游公司的数量不同。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号