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首页> 外文期刊>Review of Political Economy >Financialisation and Rising Shareholder Power in Kaleckian/Post-Kaleckian Models of Distribution and Growth
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Financialisation and Rising Shareholder Power in Kaleckian/Post-Kaleckian Models of Distribution and Growth

机译：Kaleckian / Post-Kaleckian分配与增长模型中的金融化和股东权力的提升

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We establish the link between rising shareholder power on the firm level, increasing pressure on labour, and redistribution at the expense of wages, with the macroeconomic effects on capacity utilisation, profits and capital accumulation. Three channels of transmission of ‘financialisation’ and increasing shareholder power, the ‘preference channel’, the ‘finance channel’ and the ‘distribution channel’, are introduced into two different variants of the Kaleckian distribution and growth model, the Kaleckian model and the Post-Kaleckian model. Within these models, three potential regimes of accumulation are derived, the ‘contractive’ regime, the ‘profits without investment’ regime, and the ‘finance-led growth’ regime. Only the ‘profits without investment’ regime generates a strict micro-macro identity, whereas the other two regimes are characterised by fallacies of composition, a ‘paradox of accumulation’ in the ‘finance-led growth’ regime and a ‘paradox of profits’ in the ‘contractive’ regime.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538251003665628
机译：我们在公司层面上不断增强的股东权力，不断增加的劳动力压力以及以工资为代价的再分配之间建立联系，宏观经济对产能利用，利润和资本积累产生影响。三种不同的“金融化”传递渠道和不断增强的股东权力，即“优先渠道”，“融资渠道”和“分配渠道”，被引入了两种不同的Kaleckian分布和增长模型，Kaleckian模型和Post-Kaleckian模型。在这些模型中，得出了三种潜在的积累机制，即“契约性”机制，“无投资利润”机制和“以财务为主导的增长”机制。只有“没有投资的利润”制度会产生严格的微观宏观身份，而其他两种制度的特点是构成的谬误，即“以融资为主导的增长”中的“积累悖论”。 ™体制和“合同制”体制中的“利润悖论”。查看全文下载全文相关的var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand：“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”，service_compact：“ citeulike，netvibes，twitter，technorati ，delicious，linkedin，facebook，stumbleupon，digg，google，more“，发布编号：” ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b“};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538251003665628

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