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CEO tenure and audit pricing

机译:首席执行官任期和审计定价

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We examine the relationship between CEO tenure and audit fees. After controlling for client and auditor attributes in the analyses, we find that audit fees are higher in the initial 3 years of CEOs' service, suggesting that CEOs in their early career are more likely to show high risk-taking behavior and manage earnings that increases the probability of financial misreporting. Auditors incorporate this risk in their audit pricing decisions resulting in higher audit fees. We also find that audit fees are higher in the final year of CEOs' service, supporting the argument for departing CEOs' horizon problem that CEOs in their final year are more likely to manage earnings, and auditors perceive this action as increasing reporting risk in their audit pricing decisions, resulting in higher audit fees. However, the firms with more effective audit committees pay relatively lower audit fees in initial years of CEOs' service indicating that effective audit committees reduce auditors' assessed risk during this time-period resulting in lower audit fees. We do not find any evidence on the effect of firms' CFO power and corporate social responsibility performance on audit fees in these two time-periods of CEOs' service. The main results hold in a battery of supplemental tests that include the effect of several CEO characteristics, client bargaining power and the effect of SOX. Our study extends CEO characteristics and audit fee literature, and have implications for auditors in their client acceptance and audit pricing decisions, and for regulators to identify the filers with higher financial reporting and audit engagement risk.
机译:我们研究了CEO任期与审计费之间的关系。在控制分析中的客户和审核员属性之后,我们发现首次首次职务的审计费用较高,建议在早期职业生涯中的首席执行官更有可能表现出高风险的行为和管理增加的收益金融误报的概率。审计师在审计定价决策中纳入了这种风险,导致审计费用更高。我们还发现,首席执行官服务的最后一年审计费用高,支持在最终一年中的首席执行官的地平线问题的讨论更有可能管理收入,审计员认为这一行动是越来越多的报告风险审计定价决策,导致更高的审计费用。但是,该公司在首席执行官服务中的初始审计委员会的审计费用中缴纳了相对较低的审计费用,表明有效的审计委员会在此期间减少审计师的评估风险,导致审计费率较低。我们没有找到关于公司CFO权力和企业社会责任绩效在这两次CEOS服务中对审计费用影响的任何证据。主要结果在电池中持有补充试验,包括若干首席执行官特征,客户议价能力和SOX的效果。我们的研究延长了首席执行官的特征和审计费用文学,并对审计员对客户的接受和审计定价决策产生影响,以及监管机构,以确定具有更高财务报告和审计订婚风险的文件人员。

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