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Political constraints and currency crises in emerging markets and less developed economies

机译：新兴市场和欠发达经济体的政治制约因素和货币危机

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Political institutions may directly affect the likelihood of currency crises by influencing market confidence. They may indirectly affect the likelihood of currency crises by influencing economic fundamentals. This study uses econometric mediation to estimate both direct and indirect causal pathways for veto player theory-a common framework for analyzing political institutional constraints-and finds this approach improves upon the standard econometric approach in the extant literature, which only estimates the direct causal pathway. This new mediated approach shows that political constraints also indirectly reduce the likelihood of crises through strengthening key economic fundamentals. Additionally, the analysis finds that when global conditions are stable, more constraints are shown to directly reduce the risk of crises. When global conditions are volatile, more constraints are shown to directly increase the risk of crises. Global volatility is more likely to cause crises in countries with relatively constrained political systems, and vice versa.
机译：政治机构可以通过影响市场信心直接影响货币危机的可能性。它们可能间接影响货币危机的可能性，影响经济基本面。本研究采用经济学调解来估计否决权球员理论的直接和间接因果途径 - 分析政治制度限制的共同框架 - 发现这种方法改善了现存文学中的标准计量方法，这仅估计了直接因果通路。这种新的介导的方法表明，政治限制也通过加强重点经济基础，间接减少危机的可能性。此外，分析发现，当全球条件稳定时，将显示更多的限制，直接降低危机的风险。当全球条件不稳定时，将显示更多的限制，直接增加危机的风险。全球波动性更有可能导致具有相对受限制的政治系统的国家危机，反之亦然。

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