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首页> 外文期刊>Review of world economics = >Bilateral investment treaties as deterrents of host-country discretion: the impact of investor-state disputes on foreign direct investment in developing countries
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Bilateral investment treaties as deterrents of host-country discretion: the impact of investor-state disputes on foreign direct investment in developing countries

机译：双边投资条约可遏制东道国的酌处权：投资者与国家之间的争端对发展中国家外国直接投资的影响

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摘要

The recent boom of investor-state disputes filed under international investment agreements has fueled a controversial academic and policy debate. We study the impact of these compensation claims on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the responding host country. Our econometric analysis focuses on differences in the FDI response from BIT-partner and non-partner countries of developing host countries. This approach allows us not only to distinguish competing hypotheses about BIT function, but also to address endogeneity concerns in earlier studies. We find that BITs stimulate bilateral FDI flows from partner countries-but only so long as the developing host country has not had a claim brought against it to arbitration. Our results provide an additional explanation for the policy-changes observed in many states subsequent to their first experience of an investor-state dispute.
机译：根据国际投资协议提起的投资人与国家之间争端的近期热潮引发了引起争议的学术和政策辩论。我们研究了这些赔偿要求对流向响应东道国的外国直接投资（FDI）的影响。我们的计量经济学分析侧重于发展中国家东道国的BIT伙伴国家和非伙伴国家在FDI响应方面的差异。这种方法不仅使我们能够区分有关BIT功能的竞争假设，而且能够解决早期研究中的内生性问题。我们发现，双边投资条约刺激了伙伴国家的双边外国直接投资，但前提是发展中的东道国没有提出针对它的仲裁要求。我们的结果进一步解释了许多州在首次经历投资者与国家之间的争端之后所观察到的政策变化。

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