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Deterrence and Risk Preferences in Sequential Attacker-Defender Games with Continuous Efforts

机译：连续不断的攻防比赛中的威慑和风险偏好

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摘要

Most attacker-defender games consider players as risk neutral, whereas in reality attackers and defenders may be risk seeking or risk averse. This article studies the impact of players' risk preferences on their equilibrium behavior and its effect on the notion of deterrence. In particular, we study the effects of risk preferences in a single-period, sequential game where a defender has a continuous range of investment levels that could be strategically chosen to potentially deter an attack. This article presents analytic results related to the effect of attacker and defender risk preferences on the optimal defense effort level and their impact on the deterrence level. Numerical illustrations and some discussion of the effect of risk preferences on deterrence and the utility of using such a model are provided, as well as sensitivity analysis of continuous attack investment levels and uncertainty in the defender's beliefs about the attacker's risk preference. A key contribution of this article is the identification of specific scenarios in which the defender using a model that takes into account risk preferences would be better off than a defender using a traditional risk-neutral model. This study provides insights that could be used by policy analysts and decisionmakers involved in investment decisions in security and safety.
机译：大多数攻击者/防御者游戏都将玩家视为风险中立者，而实际上，攻击者和防御者可能是寻求风险或规避风险的人。本文研究了参与者的风险偏好对其均衡行为的影响及其对威慑概念的影响。特别是，我们研究了单周期，顺序博弈中风险偏好的影响，在这种博弈中，防御者的投资水平范围是连续的，可以从战略上选择这种水平来潜在地阻止攻击。本文提供了与攻击者和防御者的风险偏好对最佳防御工作量的影响及其对威慑水平的影响有关的分析结果。提供了数值插图以及有关风险偏好对威慑作用的讨论以及使用这种模型的效用，并提供了连续攻击投资水平的敏感性分析以及防御者对攻击者风险偏好的信念的不确定性。本文的主要贡献是确定了特定的场景，在这些场景中，使用考虑了风险偏好的模型的防御者比使用传统的风险中性模型的防御者更好。这项研究提供了见识，可以由参与安全性和安全性投资决策的策略分析师和决策者使用。

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