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A General Framework for the Assessment of Power System Vulnerability to Malicious Attacks

机译：评估电力系统对恶意攻击的脆弱性的通用框架

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摘要

The protection and safe operations of power systems heavily rely on the identification of the causes of damage and service disruption. This article presents a general framework for the assessment of power system vulnerability to malicious attacks. The concept of susceptibility to an attack is employed to quantitatively evaluate the degree of exposure of the system and its components to intentional offensive actions. A scenario with two agents having opposing objectives is proposed, i.e., a defender having multiple alternatives of protection strategies for system elements, and an attacker having multiple alternatives of attack strategies against different combinations of system elements. The defender aims to minimize the system susceptibility to the attack, subject to budget constraints; on the other hand, the attacker aims to maximize the susceptibility. The problem is defined as a zero-sum game between the defender and the attacker. The assumption that the interests of the attacker and the defender are opposite makes it irrelevant whether or not the defender shows the strategy he/she will use. Thus, the approaches leader-follower game or simultaneous game do not provide differences as far as the results are concerned. The results show an example of such a situation, and the von Neumann theorem is applied to find the (mixed) equilibrium strategies of the attacker and of the defender.
机译：电力系统的保护和安全运行在很大程度上取决于对损坏和服务中断原因的识别。本文提出了一个通用框架，用于评估电力系统对恶意攻击的脆弱性。易受攻击性的概念用于定量评估系统及其组件受到故意攻击的程度。提出了具有两个具有相反目标的代理的方案，即，防御者具有针对系统元素的多种保护策略选择，而攻击者具有针对系统元素的不同组合的多种攻击策略选择。防御者的目的是在预算限制下将系统对攻击的敏感性降至最低；另一方面，攻击者旨在最大程度地提高敏感性。问题定义为防御者与攻击者之间的零和博弈。攻击者和防御者的利益相反的假设使得防御者是否显示他/她将使用的策略无关紧要。因此，就结果而言，领导者跟随游戏或同时游戏的方法不提供差异。结果显示了这种情况的一个例子，冯·诺依曼定理被用于发现攻击者和防御者的（混合）均衡策略。

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  • 来源
    《Risk analysis》 |2017年第11期|2182-2190|共9页
  • 作者

    Piccinelli R.; Sansavini G.; Lucchetti R.; Zio E.;

  • 作者单位

    Politecn Milan, Dipartimento Energia, Milan, Italy;

    Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Dept Mech & Proc Engn, Reliabil & Risk Engn Lab, Inst Energy Technol, Zurich, Switzerland;

    Politecn Milan, Dipartimento Matemat, Milan, Italy;

    Univ Paris Saclay, Chair Syst Sci & Energy Challenge, Cent Supelec, FDF, Chatenay Malabry, France|Politecn Milan, Dipartimento Energia, Milan, Italy;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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  • 关键词

    Intentional attacks; power systems; susceptibility; vulnerability; zero-sum game;

    机译：故意攻击;电力系统;敏感性;脆弱性;零和博弈;

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