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Defender-Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorism

机译：打击恐怖主义的后卫攻击者决策树分析

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摘要

We propose a methodology, called defender-attacker decision tree analysis, to evaluate defensive actions against terrorist attacks in a dynamic and hostile environment. Like most game-theoretic formulations of this problem, we assume that the defenders act rationally by maximizing their expected utility or minimizing their expected costs. However, we do not assume that attackers maximize their expected utilities. Instead, we encode the defender's limited knowledge about the attacker's motivations and capabilities as a conditional probability distribution over the attacker's decisions. We apply this methodology to the problem of defending against possible terrorist attacks on commercial airplanes, using one of three weapons: infrared-guided MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems), laser-guided MANPADS, or visually targeted RPGs (rocket propelled grenades). We also evaluate three countermeasures against these weapons: DIRCMs (directional infrared countermeasures), perimeter control around the airport, and hardening airplanes. The model includes deterrence effects, the effectiveness of the countermeasures, and the substitution of weapons and targets once a specific countermeasure is selected. It also includes a second stage of defensive decisions after an attack occurs. Key findings are: (1) due to the high cost of the countermeasures, not implementing countermeasures is the preferred defensive alternative for a large range of parameters; (2) if the probability of an attack and the associated consequences are large, a combination of DIRCMs and ground perimeter control are preferred over any single countermeasure.
机译：我们提出一种称为防御者-攻击者决策树分析的方法，以评估在动态和敌对环境中针对恐怖袭击的防御行动。像大多数关于这个问题的博弈论表述一样，我们假设防御者通过最大化其预期效用或最小化其预期成本来采取合理的行动。但是，我们不认为攻击者会最大化其预期效用。相反，我们将防御者对攻击者动机和能力的有限知识编码为攻击者决策上的条件概率分布。我们使用以下三种武器之一将这种方法论应用于防御商用飞机可能遭受的恐怖袭击的问题：红外制导的MANPADS（便携式防空系统），激光制导的MANPADS或视觉瞄准的RPG（火箭榴弹） 。我们还评估了针对这些武器的三种对策：DIRCM（定向红外对策），机场周围的边界控制以及飞机的强化。该模型包括威慑效应，对策的有效性以及选择特定对策后的武器和目标的替代。攻击发生后，它还包括第二阶段的防御决策。主要发现是：（1）由于对策的成本高昂，对于大量参数，不实施对策是首选的防御选择； （2）如果发动袭击的可能性和相关后果很大，则将DIRCM和地面周边控制相结合比任何单一对策都更可取。

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