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Game Theory and Risk Analysis

机译：博弈论与风险分析

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Risk analysts often analyze adversarial risks from terrorists or other intelligent attackers without mentioning game theory. Why? One reason is that many adversarial situations-those that can be represented as attacker-defender games, in which the defender first chooses an allocation of defensive resources to protect potential targets, and the attacker, knowing what the defender has done, then decides which targets to attack-can be modeled and analyzed successfully without using most of the concepts and terminology of game theory. However, risk analysis and game theory are also deeply complementary. Game-theoretic analyses of conflicts require modeling the probable consequences of each choice of strategies by the players and assessing the expected utilities of these probable consequences. Decision and risk analysis methods are well suited to accomplish these tasks. Conversely, game-theoretic formulations of attack-defense conflicts (and other adversarial risks) can greatly improve upon some current risk analyses that attempt to model attacker decisions as random variables or uncertain attributes of targets ("threats") and that seek to elicit their values from the defender's own experts. Game theory models that clarify the nature of the interacting decisions made by attackers and defenders and that distinguish clearly between strategic choices (decision nodes in a game tree) and random variables (chance nodes, not controlled by either attacker or defender) can produce more sensible and effective risk management recommendations for allocating defensive resources than current risk scoring models. Thus, risk analysis and game theory are (or should be) mutually reinforcing.
机译：风险分析师经常分析恐怖分子或其他聪明攻击者的对抗风险，而没有提及博弈论。为什么？原因之一是许多对抗性情况-可以表示为攻击者-防御者游戏，其中防御者首先选择一种防御资源分配来保护潜在目标，而攻击者知道防御者的所作所为，然后决定要攻击的目标无需使用博弈论的大多数概念和术语就可以成功地对攻击进行建模和分析。但是，风险分析和博弈论也具有很强的互补性。冲突的博弈论分析要求对玩家选择每种策略的可能后果进行建模，并评估这些可能后果的预期效用。决策和风险分析方法非常适合完成这些任务。相反，攻击-防御冲突（和其他对抗性风险）的博弈论表述可以大大改进一些当前的风险分析，这些分析试图将攻击者的决策建模为随机变量或目标的不确定属性（“威胁”），并试图引诱其目标。捍卫者自身专家的价值观。博弈论模型可以阐明攻击者和防御者做出的交互决策的性质，并清楚地区分战略选择（游戏树中的决策节点）和随机变量（机会节点，不受攻击者或防御者控制）可以产生更明智的选择比当前的风险评分模型更有效的风险管理建议，用于分配防御资源。因此，风险分析和博弈论是相辅相成的。

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