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Values and Objectivity in Science: Value-Ladenness, Pluralism and the Epistemic Attitude

机译：科学中的价值观和客观性：价值取向，多元化和认识论态度

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My intention is to cast light on the characteristics of epistemic or fundamental research (in contrast to application-oriented research). I contrast a Baconian notion of objectivity, expressing a correspondence of the views of scientists to the facts, with a pluralist notion, involving a critical debate between conflicting approaches. These conflicts include substantive hypotheses or theories but extend to values as well. I claim that a plurality of epistemic values serves to accomplish a non-Baconian form of objectivity that is apt to preserve most of the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science. For instance, pluralism is the only way to cope with the challenge of preference bias. Furthermore, the plurality of epistemic values cannot be substantially reduced by exploring the empirical success of scientific theories distinguished in light of particular such values. However, in addition to pluralism at the level of theories and value-commitments alike, scientific research is also characterized by a joint striving for consensus which I trace back to a shared epistemic attitude. This attitude manifests itself, e.g., in the willingness of scientists to subject their claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. This shared epistemic attitude is embodied in rules adopted by the scientific community concerning general principles of dealing with knowledge claims. My contention is that pluralism and consensus formation can be brought into harmony by placing them at different levels of consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of social conventions regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific community.
机译：我的意图是阐明认知或基础研究的特征（与面向应用程序的研究相反）。我对比了培根的客观性概念，用多元论来表达科学家的观点与事实的对应关系，其中涉及了相互矛盾的方法之间的批判性辩论。这些冲突包括实质性的假设或理论，但也涉及价值。我主张多种认识论价值有助于实现一种非培根形式的客观性，这种形式易于保留与科学客观性有关的大多数直觉。例如，多元化是应对偏好偏差挑战的唯一方法。此外，通过探索根据特定的这样的价值观而区别开的科学理论的经验成功，并不能实质性地减少多个认知价值。但是，除了在理论和价值承诺等方面的多元化之外，科学研究还具有共同努力达成共识的特点，我追溯到共同的认识论态度。这种态度例如在科学家愿意对他们的主张进行经验审查和尊重理性论证的意愿中得到体现。这种共同的认知态度体现在科学界通过的有关处理知识主张的一般原则的规则中。我的主张是，可以通过将多元性和共识形成置于不同的考虑层次来协调一致：在科学推理的层次上以及在关于如何处理科学界提出的主张的社会惯例的层次上。

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