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Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials Throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

机译:拆除和处置过程中核武器和物料保管链的支持技术

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摘要

Verification technologies based upon electromagnetics and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example,' researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency EM signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a "yeso" basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often reduce or eliminate classified data collection because of the physical limitations of the method. In such cases the need for an information barrier to prevent access to classified data is potentially eliminated, thus simplifying verification scenarios. As a result, these types of technologies may complement traditional radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons dismantlement lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. These technologies are relevant throughout a potential warhead monitoring regime, from entry into chain of custody (i.e., establishing confidence in the authenticity and integrity of the warhead) to dismantlement and final material disposition (i.e., maintaining confidence that chain of custody has not been broken).
机译:基于电磁和声学的验证技术可能在满足未来验证机制的挑战性要求方面可能发挥重要作用。例如,太平洋西北国家实验室(PNNL)的研究人员已证明,密封金属容器的低频EM签名可用于在“是/否”的基础上快速确认特定组件的存在,而无需透露机密信息。 PNNL研究人员还使用超声测量来获取材料微观结构的图像,这些图像可用作条约责任项目(TAI)的模板或唯一标识符。这种替代技术适用于武器拆卸的各个阶段,并且由于该方法的物理局限性,通常会减少或消除机密数据的收集。在这种情况下,可能会消除防止访问分类数据的信息屏障的需求,从而简化了验证场景。结果,这些类型的技术可以补充用于军备控制的传统的基于辐射的验证方法。本文概述了几种替代核查技术,这些技术适用于支持跨越核武器拆除生命周期的未来,更广泛和更具侵入性的军备控制制度。讨论了每种验证方式的一般功能和局限性,并介绍了示例技术。这些技术与整个潜在的弹头监视制度相关,从进入监管链(即建立对弹头真实性和完整性的信心)到拆除和最终物资处置(即保持对监管链没有被破坏的信心) )。

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  • 来源
    《Science & global security》 |2014年第3期|111-134|共24页
  • 作者单位

    United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Office of Verification and Transparency Technologies, Room 2250, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520;

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA;

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA;

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA;

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA;

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