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Exploring Uranium Resource Constraints on Fissile Material Production in Pakistan

机译：探索巴基斯坦的易爆物质生产中的铀资源限制

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This paper evaluates possible scenarios for Pakistan's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs since the late 1970s by using Pakistan's supply of natural uranium as a constraint. Since international sanctions have prevented Pakistan from importing uranium for decades, it has had to rely on domestic uranium production-currently estimated as approximately 40 tons a year. The paper divides the development of Pakistan's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs into three broad periods: from the beginning in the late 1970s until the 1998 nuclear tests; from 1999 to the present; and from the present to 2020; and considers how Pakistan could allocate its domestic uranium between its uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs for each period. This assessment is completed for enrichment capacities ranging from 15,000 to 75,000 separative work units (SWU) and takes into account the construction of the second and third plutonium production reactors at Khushab. The study finds that Pakistan may have sufficient natural uranium to fuel the three reactors, if they are approximately 50 MWt each, but that for some of these enrichment capacities, there will be a shortfall of natural uranium by 2020. The paper considers the impact of alternative sources of enrichment feed such as depleted tails from previous enrichment activity and reprocessed uranium from low-burn-up spent fuel from the Khushab reactors. There are signs Pakistan early on may have enriched some reprocessed uranium, possibly acquired from China. It finds that by 2020, Pakistan could have accumulated approximately 450 kg of plutonium from the Khushab reactors and 2500-6000 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) (90 percent enriched) for enrichment capacities ranging from 15,000-75,000 SWU. These stocks would be sufficient for perhaps 100-240 simple fission weapons based on HEU and for 90 plutonium weapons. Pakistan may be able to produce more weapons if it either increases its rate of uranium mining or has more advanced weapon designs requiring less fissile material in each weapon.
机译：本文以巴基斯坦的天然铀供应为约束，评估了自1970年代后期以来巴基斯坦铀浓缩和p生产计划的可能方案。由于国际制裁几十年来一直阻止巴基斯坦进口铀，因此巴基斯坦不得不依靠国内铀生产，目前估计每年约40吨。本文将巴基斯坦铀浓缩和p生产计划的发展分为三个主要阶段：从1970年代末期开始至1998年核试验；从1999年至今；从现在到2020年；并考虑了巴基斯坦如何在每个时期的铀浓缩和p生产计划之间分配其国内铀。这项评估完成了对15,000至75,000个分离工作单元（SWU）范围内的浓缩能力的评估，并考虑了在Khushab建造的第二座和第三座production生产反应堆。该研究发现，巴基斯坦可能拥有足够的天然铀来为这三个反应堆供能，如果它们各自约为50 MWt，但对于其中的一些浓缩能力，到2020年天然铀将会短缺。浓缩饲料的替代来源，例如先前浓缩活动中的贫化尾矿，以及来自库沙卜反应堆的低燃耗乏燃料中的经过再处理的铀。有迹象表明，巴基斯坦可能早些时候就浓缩了一些可能从中国获得的再加工铀。报告发现，到2020年，巴基斯坦可能从库沙卜反应堆中收集了约450千克and，以及2500-6000千克高浓缩铀（HEU）（浓缩了90％），浓缩能力在15,000-75,000 SWU之间。这些库存足够用于也许100-240个基于HEU的简单裂变武器和90个p武器。如果巴基斯坦提高铀开采率或采用更先进的武器设计，而每种武器所需的易裂变材料更少，那么巴基斯坦可能能够生产更多的武器。

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  • 来源
    《Science & global security》 |2009年第3期|77-108|共32页
  • 作者

    Zia Mian; A. H. Nayyar; R. Rajaraman;

  • 作者单位

    Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 221 Nassau St., Floor 2, Princeton, NJ 08542, USA;

    Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan;

    School of Physical Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India;

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