首页> 外文期刊>The Singapore economic review >INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN THE TWO-SIDED MARKET
【24h】

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN THE TWO-SIDED MARKET

机译:双面市场的信息披露

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

This paper analyzes information disclosure in the two-sided market with one monopolistic platform and competing platforms. We find that pertaining to the monopoly platform, greater network externalities tend to increase the information being disclosed, but with competing platforms, increasing network externalities may decrease or increase the disclosed information, depending on the information disclosure cost. However, the relation between the competitiveness of either side and the amount of disclosed information is ambiguous. We show that under certain conditions, the welfare and disclosure cost demonstrate a U-shaped relation, which cautions against the policy aiming at decreasing the information disclosure cost.
机译:本文分析了一个垄断平台与竞争平台的双面市场中的信息披露。 我们发现与垄断平台有关,更大的网络外部性倾向于增加所公开的信息,而是通过竞争平台,根据信息披露成本,增加的网络外部性可能降低或增加所公开的信息。 然而,任一侧的竞争力与所公开信息量之间的关系是含糊不清的。 我们表明,在某些条件下,福利和披露成本展示了一个U形关系,这对旨在减少信息披露成本的政策引人注目。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号