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Group lending and the role of the group leader

机译：团体贷款和团体领导者的角色

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This paper investigates strategic monitoring behavior within group lending. We show that monitoring efforts of group members differ in equilibrium due to the asymmetry between members in terms of future profits. In particular, we show that the entrepreneur with the highest future profits also puts in the highest monitoring effort. Moreover, monitoring efforts differ between group members due to free-riding: one member reduces her level of monitoring if the other increases her monitoring effort. This effect is also at play when we introduce a group leader into the model. The individual who becomes the group leader supplies more monitoring effort than in the benchmark case. We empirically test the model using data from a survey of microfinance in Eritrea and show that the group leader attaches more weight to future periods than nonleaders in the group, which may explain why a large part of total monitoring is done by the leader.
机译：本文研究了团体借贷中的战略监督行为。我们显示，由于成员之间就未来利润而言的不对称性，对成员的监督工作在均衡方面有所不同。特别是，我们表明，拥有最高未来利润的企业家也将付出最高的监督努力。此外，由于搭便车，小组成员之间的监视工作有所不同：一个成员降低了监视级别，而另一成员则增加了监视级别。当我们在模型中引入组长时，这种效果也会发挥作用。与基准案例相比，成为小组负责人的个人要付出更多的监督工作。我们使用厄立特里亚小额信贷调查的数据对模型进行了经验检验，结果表明，与非团队中的非领导者相比，组长对未来的重视程度更高，这可以解释为什么总监控中很大一部分是由领导者完成的。

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