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Westmoreland Was Right: Learning The Wrong Lessons From The Vietnam War

机译：威斯特摩兰是对的：从越南战争中学到错误的教训

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More than thirty years after the fall of Saigon, historians still argue about the lessons of the Vietnam War. Most fall into two schools of thought: those who believe that the United States failed to apply enough pressure - military and political - to the Communist government in Hanoi, and those who argue that the Americans failed to use an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy in South Vietnam. Both arguments have merit, but both ignore the Communist strategy, and the result is a skewed picture of what sort of enemy the United States actually faced in Vietnam. The reality is that the United States rarely held the initiative in Vietnam. Hanoi began a conventional troop build up in South Vietnam beginning in the early 1960s, and by the time of the US ground force intervention in 1965 the allies already faced a large and potent conventional Communist army in the South. Simply employing a 'classic' counterinsurgency strategy would have been fatal from the beginning. Despite this fact, the US military has tended to embrace flawed historical analysis to explain our failure, often concluding that there was a 'strategic choice' in Vietnam - a right way to fight and a wrong way. Most blame General William C. Westmoreland as choosing the wrong way and argue that if he had eschewed a big unit 'search and destroy' strategy, the war might have turned out differently. However, this article argues that this is untrue. Westmoreland could not have done much differently than he actually did given the realities on the ground. The flawed interpretations of the Vietnam War are not only bad history, but they also lead military and political policymakers to bad decisions in current counterinsurgency strategy. As the US military finds itself embroiled in unconventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs clear lessons from America's longest counterinsurgency campaign - the Vietnam War.
机译：西贡沦陷后三十多年，历史学家们仍在争论越南战争的教训。大多数人陷入两种思想流派：那些认为美国没有对河内共产党政府施加足够的军事和政治压力的人，以及那些认为美国人没有在越南南部使用适当的平叛战略的人。两种论点都有其优点，但都忽略了共产主义战略，其结果是一幅歪曲的画面，表明美国实际上在越南面临什么样的敌人。现实情况是，美国很少在越南采取主动行动。河内从1960年代初开始在越南南部建立常规部队，到1965年美国地面部队介入时，盟国已经在南部面临一支庞大而强大的常规共产党军队。从一开始，仅仅采用“经典”的平叛策略就将是致命的。尽管如此，美军还是倾向于采用错误的历史分析来解释我们的失败，通常会得出结论，越南存在“战略选择”，这是正确的战斗方式和错误的方式。多数怪罪威廉·韦斯特摩兰德将军（William C. Westmoreland）选择了错误的方式，并辩称，如果他放弃了一个大部门的“搜索并摧毁”战略，那么战争的结果可能会有所不同。但是，本文认为这是不正确的。威斯特摩兰（Westmoreland）所做的工作与实际情况相去无远。对越南战争的错误解释不仅是糟糕的历史，而且还导致军事和政治决策者在当前的平叛战略中做出错误的决定。由于美军陷入了伊拉克和阿富汗的非常规战争之中，它需要美国最长的平叛运动越南战争的明确教训。

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