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Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Demand Response in Electricity Markets

机译：电力市场需求响应的博弈论框架

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摘要

This paper presents game-theoretic frameworks for demand response at both electricity market and consumer levels. First, the interaction between a demand response aggregator (DRA) and electricity generators is modeled as a Stackelberg game in which the DRA, as the leader of the game, makes demand reduction bids, and generators, as followers, compete for maximizing their profits based on the reduced demand. Next, the interaction between the DRA and consumers is modeled as a mechanism design problem wherein the DRA seeks to minimize the aggregate inconvenience of consumers while achieving the targeted load curtailment. The inconvenience function of each consumer is captured by a type value, which is used by the DRA to solve the load curtailment problem. A Vickrey–Clarke–Groves-based mechanism is proposed, which guarantees that each consumer reveals its true type value to the DRA. A case study of the Stackelberg game shows that, in the South Australian electricity market where there is significant renewable penetration, peak period demand response provides the maximum potential profit, but off-peak demand response even in a concentrated market is not financially attractive.
机译：本文提出了用于在电力市场和消费者层面进行需求响应的博弈论框架。首先，需求响应汇总器（DRA）与发电机之间的交互被建模为Stackelberg游戏，其中DRA作为游戏的领导者降低需求，而发电机作为追随者竞争以最大化他们的利润为基础。减少需求。接下来，DRA与消费者之间的交互被建模为一种机制设计问题，其中DRA力求在实现目标负载削减的同时将消费者的总体不便最小化。每个消费者的不便功能由类型值捕获，DRA使用该类型值来解决减少负载的问题。提出了一种基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves的机制，该机制可确保每个消费者向DRA揭示其真实类型价值。对Stackelberg博弈的案例研究表明，在可再生能源普及率很高的南澳大利亚州电力市场中，高峰期需求响应可提供最大的潜在利润，但是即使在集中市场中，非高峰期需求响应也没有财务吸引力。

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