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Detection of Stealthy Cyber-Physical Line Disconnection Attacks in Smart Grid

机译：检测智能电网中隐形网络物理线路断开攻击

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摘要

This paper considers stealthy cyber-physical attacks in power systems where one or more lines and buses are disconnected by opening their respective switches/circuit breakers and to conceal such attacks, the SCADA and PMU measurements are manipulated stealthily. The paper presents a framework based on the non-linear power flow model to characterize such cyber-physical attacks and proposes a technique that uses switching transients for detecting them. The detection methodology uses the fact that any physical disconnection will cause a notable amount of transients in the system. These transient components measured by the PMUs are used to validate the legitimacy of the steady-state values of SCADA and PMU measurements and detect stealthy line disconnection and bus outage attacks. The proposed technique has been tested on the IEEE 30 bus system and it is shown that it can detect the cyber-physical attacks that conceal multiple line disconnections and bus outages under various load conditions.
机译：本文考虑了通过打开各自的开关/断路器并隐藏这种攻击，悄悄地操纵一个或多个线路和公共汽车的电力系统中的秘密网络物理攻击。本文提出了一种基于非线性电流模型的框架，以表征这种网络物理攻击，并提出了一种使用切换瞬态来检测它们的技术。检测方法使用任何物理断开将导致系统中的显着瞬变量的事实。由PMU测量的这些瞬态组件用于验证SCADA和PMU测量的稳态值的合法性，并检测隐身线断开和总线中断攻击。所提出的技术已经在IEEE 30总线系统上进行了测试，并显示它可以检测在各种负载条件下隐藏多线断开和公交车站的网络物理攻击。

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